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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellants brought this case in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah 
County claiming breach of contract, fraud and negligence against Farmers Insurance 
Exchange pursuant to a policy issued in Utah County, State of Utah and against agent 
Randall L. Tuckett. Appellants are residents of Utah County, State of Utah. Jurisdiction 
and venue of the action were uncontested and deemed to be present. 
Appellate jurisdiction was originally vested in the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to §78-2-2(3)0), Utah Code Ann. (1992). This matter was transferred to the 
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to the authority of the Supreme Court as provided in 
§78-2-2(4), Utah Code Ann. (1992). 
ISSUES 
1. What is the extent of coverage for the insurance policy purchased by appellant, 
Barbara Simmons, from Farmers Insurance under the collision and liability provisions, 
for the loss sustained in the motor vehicle collision of May 11, 1985? 
a. Are the terms of the policy clear and unambiguous so that they may 
be interpreted in accordance with their plain and ordinary meaning? 
b. Are the limitations and exclusions of the policy reasonable and 
consistent? 
c. Should the common law doctrine of reasonable expectations allow 
the appellant to collect additional damages outside the limitations and exclusions of the 
policy she purchased? 
2. Did Farmers Insurance comply with its implied contractual duty to deal in good 
faith by issuing appellant Barbara Simmons the policy of her choice for two vehicles: a 
1974 Chevrolet Blazer and a 1965 Ford truck? 
3. Did Farmers Insurance Exchange have a duty to defend appellant Barbara 
Simmons in appellant Marvin Clayson's action against her for the loss of the trailer 
sustained in the motor vehicle collision on May 11, 1985, when the provisions of the 
policy excluded Farmers Insurance from any liability? 
4. Was summary judgment appropriate in the lower court, even though the ruling 
did not address every issue raised in the appellants' Complaint? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Primary issues in this case involve interpreting the terms, exclusions and 
limitations of a contract, i.e. the insurance policy issued by Farmers Insurance Exchange 
to the appellant, Barbara Simmons. "Questions of contract interpretation not requiring 
resort to extrinsic evidence are matters of law, and on such questions we accord the trial 
2 
court's interpretation no presumption of correctness." Zion First National Bank v. 
National American Title Insurance. 741 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988). 
This case was decided by a summary judgment issued by the lower court. 
By definition, a summary judgment is based solely on conclusions of law; therefore, 
summary judgment should be reviewed for correctness without deferring to the trial 
court's legal determinations. Allen v. Prudential Property. 190 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 
(1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Barbara Simmons, made a claim on her insurer, Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, for damages related to a motor vehicle accident in which she was 
involved on May 11, 1985. The horse-trailer she had borrowed from her friend, and 
cousin-by-marriage Marvin Sam Clayson, was damaged (R. 8). Upon checking the 
provisions of the policy, appellant, Barbara Simmons had purchased, Farmers Insurance 
determined that collision damages was limited to $500 and they promptly paid that 
amount to Ms. Simmons (R. 91). Appellant, Barbara Simmons, disputed the amount of 
collision damages available to her and also claimed liability coverage should have been 
extended to her, both for damages and for a duty to defend her against a subsequent 
lawsuit by Marvin Sam Clayson for the damages to the horse-trailer (R. 6). After 
Farmers Insurance informed appellant, Barbara Simmons, they would not defend her in 
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a lawsuit brought by Marvin Sam Clayson, Barbara Simmons took no further action and 
allowed default judgment to be taken against her in that suit (R. 204, 206). Then Marvin 
Sam Clayson and Barbara Simmons joined together to file this action against Farmers 
Insurance Exchange (R. 9). 
The trial court granted defendant/appellee, Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
Motion for Summary Judgment on October 16, 1992 (R. 412). Appellants appealed to 
the Utah Supreme Court within the requisite time period (R. 419). Appellee, Farmers 
Insurance Exchange made a motion to dismiss the appeal because the summary judgment 
was not a final order or judgment of all the claims against the defendants. Appellants 
filed an objection to that motion. The Court denied summary disposition stating the issue 
should be addressed in the briefing and transferred this case to the court of appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Appellants' claim for insurance coverage arises from an automobile 
accident which occurred in Arizona on May 11, 1985, which resulted in the destruction 
of a horse-trailer. Barbara Simmons had borrowed the horse-trailer on or about May 9, 
1985 from her friend, and cousin-by-marriage Marvin Sam Clayson. While Barbara 
Simmons was transporting hay in the horse-trailer, the 1965 Ford pick-up truck, which 
she was using to pull the trailer, over-heated. While she was thus stopped, another 
vehicle struck the horse-trailer from the rear (R. 8). 
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2. The 1965 Ford Truck was, at the time of the collision, insured 
pursuant to Farmers Insurance E-Z Reader Car Policy. Defendants take issue with the 
appellants' characterization of the insurance policy, which was to provide "full coverage" 
for any and all the covered losses sustained by covered vehicle or driver. Such 
characterization of "full coverage" is appellants' characterization and not a term of art. 
Mr. Tuckett provided full coverage on the 1965 Ford Truck with a $500 deductible on 
collision coverage. Such coverage is full coverage subject to the deductibles and 
limitations set forth in the policy (R. 31-33). 
3. On July 19, 1985 attorney R. Phil Ivie, on behalf of Barbara 
Simmons, made a demand on Farmers Insurance for the full costs of replacing the horse-
trailer claiming the horse-trailer was a "private passenger car" and a "motor vehicle" as 
covered by the policy. (Letter to Harry Watson, July 19, 1985, Exhibit "A" attached 
hereto; R. 247). Farmers Insurance Provo branch claims office received said demand 
letter on July 24, 1985. 
4. On August 5, 1985, twelve (12) days after receiving R. Phil Ivie's 
initial demand, Farmers Insurance paid $500 to Barbara Simmons for the loss of the 
horse-trailer, as is shown by the copy of the draft to Barbara Simmons in the amount of 
$500. (Exhibit "B", attached hereto; R. 91). Five hundred dollars is the policy limit for 
collision coverage on a utility trailer not owned by the insured under the policy. (See 
Policy, Limits of Liability, Page 5, Exhibit "C"; R. 82). 
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5. On August 15, 1985, Farmers Insurance received a letter of opinion 
from counsel Alma Nelson of BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN, which 
stated that the horse-trailer should qualify as a "utility trailer" under the terms of the 
policy and that "it does not qualify as a private passenger car, therefore the coverage 
would be limited to $500." (See Exhibit "D", R. 181). 
6. On October 11, 1985, R. Phil Ivie sent a letter to both Barbara 
Simmons and Marvin Sam Clayson acknowledging, "[Therefore, while we face 
significant difficulties in recovering under the collision portion of your policy, 
(convincing the court that the horse-trailer is a motor vehicle), it appears to be much 
easier to claim against the liability coverage of the party that struck you and permit them 
to collect whatever they feel they can through the liability portion on the Farmers 
Insurance policy." (See copy of letter addressed to Mr. and Mrs. Simmons, Exhibit "E"; 
R. 235). 
7. Farmers Insurance defended Barbara Simmons against all claims 
asserted against her in an Arizona lawsuit arising from the collision in question and has 
settled all such claims. Farmers Insurance has paid in excess of $66,000 to settle bodily 
injury claims in the Arizona action, and in excess of $19,000 for property damage arising 
from the collision, even though the policy issued to Barbara Simmons had limits of 
$50,000.00. (See Affidavit of Jon Topol, Exhibit "F"; R. 195-196). 
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8. On April 10, 1986, Marvin Clayson, through attorney James Clark, 
filed suit against Barbara Simmons for damages to the horse-trailer claiming that Barbara 
Simmons was either negligent or alternatively that she breached a contractual assumption 
of liability for the horse-trailer (R. 423; Exhibit "G"). 
9. On May 9, 1986, Barbara Simmons went to Jim Clark's office and 
signed an Acceptance of Service in his presence. (See Deposition of Barbara Simmons, 
March 13, 1990, Page 38, Exhibit "H"; R. 218, 423). James Clark personally notarized 
the Acceptance of Service (see Exhibit "I"; R. 208). 
10. On May 11, 1986, Barbara Simmons delivered the Complaint filed 
against her by Marvin Sam Clayson to Farmers Insurance. (Deposition of Barbara 
Simmons, page 30, Exhibit "H", R. 423). 
11. On May 22, 1986, Farmers Insurance declined coverage and 
defense of the claims asserted against Ms. Simmons, citing exclusions 7 and 8 under the 
liability portion of the E-Z Reader policy and reserving any other defenses. (See letter 
addressed to Barbara Simmons, May 22, 1986, Exhibit "E"; R. 206). 
12. Barbara Simmons failed to take any further action in defense of the 
claims asserted against her by Marvin Sam Clayson or to employ counsel to do so. 
(Deposition of Barbara Simmons, Pages 42-43, Exhibit "H"; R. 423). 
13. On June 16, 1986, Marvin Sam Clayson obtained a default 
judgment against Barbara Simmons for the full amount claimed in the Complaint, i.e. 
7 
$7,000, the alleged price of a new horse-trailer. (R. 204, 230-231). The horse-trailer 
that is the subject of this action was seven years old at the time of its destruction. (See 
Deposition of Marvin Sam Clayson, Page 7, Exhibit "J"; R. 422). 
14. On June 3, 1988, after obtaining a default judgment on behalf of 
Marvin Sam Clayson against Barbara Simmons, James Clark undertook to represent both 
Marvin Sam Clayson and Barbara Simmons in filing suit against Farmers Insurance 
alleging Farmers Insurance Exchange liability for payment of a default judgment in bad 
faith. 
15. As of March 13, 1990, nearly four years after he obtained default 
judgment against Barbara Simmons, Marvin Sam Clayson had no knowledge of any 
collection efforts to collect the judgment from Barbara Simmons. (Deposition of Marvin 
Clayson, Page 26, Exhibit "J"; R. 422). 
16. Although Barbara Simmons received $500 from Farmers Insurance 
for damages to Marvin Sam Clayson's horse-trailer, she admits that she has not paid any 
money to Marvin Sam Clayson. (Deposition of Barbara Simmons, Pages 33-34, Exhibit 
"H"; R. 423). 
17. Appellant, Barbara Simmons who is now a default judgment debtor 
and appellant, Marvin Sam Clayson, the judgment creditor, have cooperated in this action 
to "get Sam a trailer." (See Deposition of Barbara Simmons, Page 35, Exhibit "H"; R. 
423). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant Marvin Sam Clayson lacks any standing to assert claims in this 
action. Though counsel for appellants, James Clark asserts that Barbara Simmons has 
assigned Marvin Sam Clayson "all rights, claims and interests that she had against 
Farmers," it is clear from depositions of both Barbara Simmons and Marvin Sam Clayson 
that no assignment has, in fact, been made. Accordingly, all claims asserted by Marvin 
Sam Clayson against Farmers Insurance must fail as a matter of law (R. 86). 
The horse-trailer which was damaged in this case qualifies for coverage 
under the collision portion of Barbara Simmons insurance policy as a utility trailer. The 
policy limits the liability for a utility trailer not owned by the insured or a family 
member to $500 (R. 82). Since the trailer in this case was not owned by the insured 
Barbara Simmons, Farmers Insurance paid $500 to Ms. Simmons, the full policy limits. 
Though the policy definition of "your insured car" may include any utility 
trailer that you own, or is attached to your insured car, utility trailers not owned by the 
insured are not covered beyond the $500 limit. Appellants contention that the trailer is 
no longer a trailer when it becomes part of the "insured car" is an unreasonable 
construction of the policy language and contradicts the policy's plain meaning. Because 
the terms are clear, there is no need to resort to extrinsic interpretations. The appellants 
claims of ambiguity are unfounded. 
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The horse-trailer in question also does not satisfy the requirements of a 
private passenger car. The policy defines "private passenger car" as a four wheel, land 
motor vehicle of a private passenger or station wagon type. In spite of appellants 
contentions that the term "motor vehicle" is ambiguous with respect to a horse-trailer, 
it is, in fact, self-defining. At the very least it refers to vehicles that have motors, and 
could not include a motorless horse-trailer. Appellants attempt to create ambiguity by 
searching through the Utah Code for extraneous definitions of "motor vehicle." 
Appellants' use of extra contractual definitions provided by the Utah Code is misplaced 
and, in fact, contradictory. Resorting to extrinsic evidence is only appropriate for the 
purpose of clarifying an existing ambiguity. By its plain and ordinary meaning, "motor 
vehicle" is unambiguous and does not include a horse-trailer. Appellants surmise that 
any exclusions or limitations that are construed to limit the liability of the insurance 
company are unclear and ambiguous. Such an interpretation is unsupported by law. 
The insurance policy contains three specific exclusions from liability for 
damages to this horse-trailer. Exclusion No. 7 states coverage does not apply to 
damaged property owned or transported by an insured person. Exclusion No. 8 provides 
no coverage or damage to property rented to or in the charge of an insured person. 
Number 12 excludes liability for any contract or agreement, except liability of others you 
assume in a written contract relating to the use of an auto you do not own. Each of these 
exclusions applies to the horse-trailer damaged in this case since it was property 
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transported by Barbara Simmons, the insured person. The trailer was in the charge of 
the insured and Ms. Simmons is claiming she assumed the liability for the trailer from 
its owner, which liability was not assumed in a written contract or for the use of an auto. 
Appellants have relied on the doctrine of reasonable expectations in direct 
conflict with the recent pronouncements of the Utah Supreme Court. Ms. Simmons' 
expectation for unlimited coverage for a borrowed horse-trailer are unreasonable. Such 
expectations are also extrinsic to the insurance policy and therefore inadmissible, except 
to clarify ambiguity. Even if her expectations were reasonable, they are clearly excluded 
under the Supreme Court's reasoning in Allen v. Prudential Property. 190 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 8 (1992), since such expectations conflict with the plain terms of the Farmers 
Insurance policy. 
Appellants claim of bad faith in issuing Barbara Simmons a policy with 
a $500 deductible on a vehicle valued at $350 is not ripe. This issue has not been raised 
in any previous motions nor addressed by the lower court. It is an attempt to cloud 
legitimate controversies before this court. 
Because Farmers Insurance promptly paid to Barbara Simmons the limits 
of liability coverage, it was under no further duty to defend or indemnify Barbara 
Simmons against other claims. Farmers Insurance based its denial of appellants claims 
for additional relief on the independent advice of legal counsel, which provides a good 
faith basis for an insurer's defense of a bad faith claim. Though appellants knew that 
11 
their claims were meritless, they have colluded in their efforts to impose liability on 
Farmers Insurance and "get Sam a trailer." (R. 423). 
Appellants claims against Farmers Insurance have been inconsistent with 
its position depending upon the nature of the motion to be filed. In its Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Appellants Appeal, appellants stated "this case has been 
dismiss for all claims." Further, it stated "no claims remain to be determined regarding 
the agency actions of Randall L. Tuckett." (See Appellants Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Appeal and Request Oral Arguments, Page 3, 4). 
Now appellants claim that the court did not address these alternative causes of action. 
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment for Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
and any issues left unresolved were the result of appellants lack of diligence to prosecute 
their case. 
The lower court correctly granted summary judgment for Farmers 
Insurance Exchange. The horse-trailer clearly meets the policy definition of a utility 
trailer, not owned by the insured, which has a $500 limit on liability. The trial court 
correctly recognized that the horse-trailer did not fall under any other proffered definition 
by appellants, such as a private passenger car or a land motor vehicle and that policy 
provisions clearly excluded the trailer from further liability. The lower court was also 
correct in its interpretations of a recent Allen v. Prudential Property. 190 Utah Adv. 
12 
Rep. 8 (1992) case in recognizing that the insured's reasonable expectations were not 
relevant to her claims. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT FARMERS INSURANCE HAS PAID TO BARBARA SIMMONS 
THE FULL LIMITS OF COVERAGE UNDER HER INSURANCE POLICY. 
Barbara Simmons, default judgment debtor, and Marvin Sam Clayson, 
judgment creditor, have joined together in this action against Farmers Insurance in an 
effort to impose liability on Farmers Insurance for the loss of Marvin Sam Clayson's 
horse-trailer. Marvin Sam Clayson, is a stranger to the contract of insurance between 
Farmers Insurance and Barbara Simmons, and, therefore, lacks standing to assert any 
claim against Farmers Insurance. "In Utah, a appellant must direct his action against the 
actual tort-feasor not the insurer." Campbell v. Stagg. 596 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1979). 
James Clark has asserted in the present claim against Farmers Insurance that Barbara 
Simmons has assigned to Marvin Sam Clayson "all rights, claims and interests that she 
had against Farmers." If this were true, than Barbara Simmons would have no further 
standing to assert claims against Farmers Insurance. However, it is clear from the 
depositions of both Barbara Simmons and Marvin Sam Clayson that no assignment has, 
in fact, been made. Neither appellant, as of their depositions taken on March 13, 1990, 
had any knowledge of any assignments of rights or claims in this action. (See Deposition 
of Barbara Simmons, Page 35, 36, Exhibit "H" attached hereto, R. 423 and Deposition 
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of Marvin Clayson, Page 28, Exhibit "J" attached hereto; R. 422). Accordingly, all 
claims asserted by Marvin Sam Clayson against Farmers Insurance must fail as a matter 
of law. 
Whether or not there has been an assignment is inconsequential for 
purposes of this appeal. Barbara Simmons' claims against Farmers Insurance are wholly 
without merit whether they have been assigned or not. Farmers Insurance has fully 
performed its contractual obligations to Barbara Simmons under her insurance policy. 
Farmers Insurance defended Barbara Simmons against all claims asserted against her in 
the Arizona lawsuit arising from the collision in question and has settled all claims. 
Farmers Insurance has paid an excess of $66,000 to settle bodily injury claims in the 
Arizona action and an excess of $19,000 for property damage arising from that collision. 
(Affidavit of Jon Topol, Exhibit "F"; R. 196). Furthermore, Farmers Insurance has paid 
$500 to Barbara Simmons for damage to the horse-trailer at issue in this present action. 
Barbara Simmons now claims that she is entitled to the full replacement cost of a new 
horse-trailer under the policy. Farmers Insurance disputes the validity of the default 
judgment obtained against Barbara Simmons for the loss of the horse-trailer. It also 
disputes that she is liable for such damages. Furthermore, Farmers Insurance would 
dispute the amount of loss claimed in this action. The $7,000, by Marvin Sam Clayson's 
own admission, is an approximate cost of purchasing a new horse-trailer, seven years old 
at the time of the collision which is the subject of this case. The horse-trailer that is the 
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subject of this action was a 1978 livestock trailer. (See deposition of Marvin Sam 
Clayson, Page 7; R. 422). 
Such disputed facts are immaterial for purposes of this appeal. Questions 
of contract interpretation are matters of law and thus, the Court's ruling is an issue of 
law. Valley Bank and Trust v. United States Life Title Insurance. 776 P.2d 993, 934 
(Utah App. 1989). The plain language of Farmers Insurance E-Z Reader Policy provides 
a limit of $500 for the kind of loss allegedly sustained by the appellant in this case. 
Farmers Insurance has already paid to the appellant the full limits of the policy prior to 
the commencement of this action in 1986 and has in all other ways fulfilled its obligation 
under the policy. (Affidavit of Jon Topol, Exhibit "F"; R. 195). 
A. Under the policy purchased by appellant. Barbara Simmons, the damaged horse-
trailer is a utility trailer not owned by her, with a $500 liability limit, which was 
paid. 
Farmers Insurance does not dispute that the horse-trailer, even though it 
was not owned by Barbara Simmons, was covered under the collision portion of 
insurance policy. However, the only provision of the policy under which the horse-
trailer could qualify for coverage is as a utility trailer. Under definitions in the first page 
of the insured's policy it provides: 
Utility trailer means a vehicle designed to be towed by a 
private passenger car and includes a farm wagon or farm 
implement while towed by a private passenger car or utility 
car. It does not include a trailer used as an office, store, 
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display or passenger trailer. (Bold in original)(Policy, 
Exhibit MC", R. 86). 
If the horse-trailer is to qualify for coverage under the policy at all it must fit under the 
foregoing definition. It is clearly a vehicle that is designed to be towed by a private 
passenger car and can be characterized or analogized to a farm wagon or farm 
implement. Barbara Simmons admits she received a copy of Farmers Insurance E-Z 
Reader policy. Ms. Simmons also admits that Farmers Insurance paid her $500 for 
damage to the horse-trailer owned by Marvin Sam Clay son. (Deposition of Barbara 
Simmons, page 23, Exhibit "H"; R. 423). 
The E-Z Reader policy clearly states under Limits of Liability, in Part 4-
Damage to your car: 
Our limits of liability for loss shall not exceed the lowest of: 
1) the actual cash value of the stolen or damaged property, 
2) the amount necessary to repair or replace property or 
parts with other of like kind and quality less depreciation, 
3) $500 for a utility trailer not owned by you or a family 
member. (Bold in original). (Policy, Exhibit "C", R. 82). 
Thus the language of the policy unambiguously provides a $500 maximum coverage for 
collision damage to a utility trailer not owned by a policy holder. It is undisputed that 
the horse-trailer in question in this case was not owned by Barbara Simmons. At the 
time of the collision damage, Barbara Simmons had borrowed the horse-trailer from 
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Marvin Sam Clay son and was in the process of towing it behind her 1965 Ford pick-up 
truck. 
As a measure of Farmers Insurance good faith in settling Ms. Simmons 
claim for damages to the horse-trailer, Farmers Insurance promptly paid $500, the full 
policy limits, to Barbara Simmons just twelve (12) days after receiving R. Phil Ivie's 
demand for such damages to the trailer. 
In contract interpretation each contract provision is to be considered in 
relation to the other. Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner. 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-1062 (Utah 
1981). The policy's definitions specifically address the characteristics of a "trailer" as 
noted above. Because the policy defines a "utility trailer" as a vehicle pulled by a 
"private passenger car," a "horse-trailer" could not possibly be a "trailer" and 
simultaneously be a "private passenger car" or "utility car" pulling that "trailer." To 
adopt such interpretation as presented by appellant, that a horse-trailer is a land motor 
vehicle, would mean the horse-trailer would have to be able to pull a utility trailer to 
give the utility trailer definition meaning. 
Appellants attempt to characterize the trailer as part of Ms. Simmons 
insured car, and therefore subject to full coverage for loss. The collision provision 
provides coverage for loss to "your insured car." The policy defines your insured car 
to include an automobile with an utility trailer attached to it. 
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"Your insured car" means: 
3) any utility trailer: a) that you own, or b) while attached 
to your insured car). 
Here the trailer was attached to Ms. Simmons insured car, thereby allegedly becoming 
part of the insured vehicle car and trailer. However, as mentioned above, the collision 
provision states that utility trailers not owned by the insured are not covered beyond 
$500. Appellants assert that this provision does not apply to the trailer at issue, although 
not owned by her. Appellants interpret the provision to mean that if a trailer is either 
owned by the insured or attached to the insured's vehicle it becomes, "your insured car," 
and is no longer viewed as an utility trailer. Since the trailer was attached to Ms. 
Simmons car, appellants contend it was no longer a "utility trailer" subject to the $500 
limitation, but instead Ms. Simmons "insured car" subject to full coverage. 
Appellants construction of the policy language is unreasonable. The fact 
that the trailer was attached to an automobile does not change the fact that the trailer was 
still a trailer, subject to liability limitations. While a trailer attached to an insured car 
becomes your insured car, the full coverage normally provided for loss to "your insured 
car" is expressly limited to $500 for an attached utility trailer which is not owned by the 
insured. Here, the trailer was not owned by the insured, Barbara Simmons. 
The appellants' construction of the policy contradicts the policy's plain 
meaning. Such manipulation of policy language is not reasonable and opposes the 
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ordinary meaning of that language. As the Court states in Valley Bank & Trust v. 
United States Life Title Insurance. 776 P.2d 993, 936 (Utah App. 1989): 
Notwithstanding general recognized principles of strict 
construction, if the terms of the insurance policy are clear 
and unambiguous, we interpret those terms in accordance 
with their plain and ordinary meaning. 
Since the terms here are clear there is no need to resort to extrinsic interpretations and 
no need to apply any other than the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms. The 
collision provision unambiguously limits the defendants liability for damages for the 
trailer to $500. The appellants claims of ambiguity are unfounded. 
Appellants present the Deposition of Ellis Ferrell, a Farmers Insurance 
claims adjustor at the time of the accident, for the proposition that the differences in 
coverage of utility trailers can only be as asserted by appellant. 
Q. Can you explain that difference, please. 
A. The difference is when utility trailers attach to the car, there may 
be some coverages that cover the utility trailer owned, or non-
owned, which may not be in force when the utility trailer is not 
attached to the car. (See Deposition of Ellis P. Ferrell, Page 
37:25 - 38:9; R. 297). 
Appellant has attached his own interpretation to these comments to promote his theory 
of this case. Under the terms of the policy the facts are that if the trailer were not 
owned by the insured and not attached to the insured car or vehicle, obviously no 
coverage would be extended. However, when a utility trailer, not owned by the insured, 
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is attached to the insured's vehicle, collision coverage is extended under the terms of the 
policy but limited to $500. In addition, Mr. Ferrell is speaking as an individual and has 
no authority or recognition as a spokesperson for Farmers Insurance. 
B. Appellants' horse-trailer does not fall under the definition of private 
passenger car as defined by appellants' collision insurance policy. 
Appellants' policy extended coverage to motor vehicles not owned by the 
appellant when she drove with the owner's permission. Under the initial definitions of 
the insurance policy and the additional definitions in Part IV, an insured car shall, 
"include any other private passenger car, utility car or utility trailer not owned by you. 
. . ." Appellant has claimed that the borrowed trailer is a "private passenger car" under 
definitions of the policy and the Utah Code, and that coverage should be extended to 
reimburse appellant for its value. However, contrary to appellants' assertions, a horse-
trailer can not be considered a private passenger car under the plain and clear definitions 
of the policy. The intentions of contracting parties "must be determined from an 
examination of the text of the agreements." Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National Bank. 737 
P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). 
The policy states in the definition section on the first page: 
Private passenger car means a four-wheel land motor 
vehicle of the private passenger or station wagon type 
actually licensed for use upon public highways. It includes 
any motor home with no more than six wheels and not used 
for business purposes. (Emphasis added, R. 86). 
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The insurance policy in the above definition defines motor vehicle by example. A 
private passenger car is a passenger or station wagon type motor vehicle or motorhome. 
Certainly, it is clear that a horse-trailer does not satisfy the requirements of a private 
passenger car. 
Appellants contend that because the policy of Farmers Insurance does not 
specifically define motor vehicle in their list of definitions in the policy, a search outside 
of the policy is necessary to provide this definition. Appellants' contentions depend upon 
the horse-trailer being classified as a "motor vehicle." Appellants have utterly failed to 
demonstrate how the term "motor vehicle" is ambiguous with respect to a horse-trailer. 
The term "motor vehicle" is self-defining. At the very least it refers to vehicles that 
have motors. Yet, the appellant seems to have overlooked another important rule of 
insurance policy construction set forth in Fuller v. Director of Finance. 694 P.2d 1045, 
1047 (Utah 1985): 
In interpreting insurance policies we have held that 
ambiguities are to be construed against the insurer and 
words are to be given their ordinary meaning. 
The ordinary meaning of "motor vehicle" simply does not include a 
motorless horse-trailer. Appellants' use of extra contractual definitions provided by the 
Utah Code to define "motor vehicle" is misplaced. Appellants use a definition of motor 
vehicle from the Utah Safety Responsibility Act. The Utah Safety Responsibility Act, 
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Utah Code Ann. §41-12-l(e) (1981, repealed in 1985), but applicable to the instant case, 
states: 
The motor vehicle means every self-propelled vehicle 
which is designed for use for upon a highway including 
trailers and semi-trailers, (emphasis added). 
Although this section of the Utah Code includes trailers within its definitions of motor 
vehicles, for several purposes, the insurance policy itself excludes trailers from inclusion 
under its definition of land motor vehicles. The policy language separates definition of 
private passenger car and utility trailer, distinguishing between a car and a trailer. The 
Utah Code's definition should not be imposed upon the insurance policy's terms in order 
to make a new contract. Cornwall v. Willowcreek Country Club. 13 Utah 2d 160, 369 
P.2d 928 (1962). 
Appellants' counsel also claims that because the horse-trailer was required 
to be registered under Title 41 of the Utah Code and because it has four wheels, it is a 
motor vehicle as defined in numerous other acts in the Utah Code. However, under Title 
41, motor vehicle, "means every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which 
is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires but not operated 
upon rails." (emphasis added). Utah Code Ann. §41-6-1(20) (1981). The horse-trailer 
in question is certainly not self-propelled and hence is not included within this definition 
of motor vehicle. 
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Appellants citation of Utah Code Ann. §31-41-3 (1981, repealed 1985) 
defining "motor vehicle" is also misplaced. Immediately preceding appellants quote that 
" '[M]otor vehicle' means any vehicle of a kind required to be registered under Title 41 
but excluding, however, motorcycles," the Utah State Legislature states the purpose of 
the Act. "This act is not designed to have any effect on property damage claims." Utah 
Code Ann. §31-41-2 (1953). The instant case deals specifically with property damage 
to a horse trailer and not the "customary tort claims or the most serious types of 
(personal) injuries." Utah Code Ann. §31-41-2 (1953). As stated by the Court in Barber 
v. Farmers Insurance. 751 P.2d 248 (Utah 1988) (quoting Utah Code Ann. §31-41-2 
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(1985)): 
The statement of purpose proceeding the No-Fault Act 
provides in relevant part that "[T]he intention of the 
legislature is to . . . effectuate a more efficient equitable 
method of handling the greater bulk of the personal injury 
claims that arise out of automobile accidents, (emphasis 
added). 
Certainly the no-fault application has no application to this property damage claim. 
Rather than abiding by the ordinary meaning of motor vehicle, appellants have 
referred to definitions found in the Utah Code Annotated. Such definitions are extrinsic 
to the insurance contract in this case. 
The basic rule of contract interpretation is that the intent of 
the parties is to be ascertained from the content of the 
instrument itself, the rationale for the rule being to 
preserve the sanctity of written instruments . . . . It is only 
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when an ambiguity exists which cannot be reconciled by an 
object and reasonable interpretation of the contract as a 
whole that resort may be had to the use of extrinsic 
evidence. 
Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner. 636 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 1981), see also Atlas Corp.. 
737 P.2d at 229. (If the contract language is ambiguous or uncertain after careful 
consideration of the whole integration, only then should a court consider extrinsic 
evidence to determine the party's intent.) 
Appellants' reference to definitions contained in the Utah Code is clearly 
an improper use of extrinsic evidence. As stated above, a party may resort to extrinsic 
evidence only for the purpose of clarifying an existing ambiguity. The appellants in the 
present case have resorted to extrinsic evidence in an effort to create ambiguity where 
none in fact exists. By its plain and ordinary meaning, "motor vehicle" does not include 
a horse-trailer. 
Appellants and their counsel were well aware of the tenuous nature of the 
claims presently being pursued early on in the dispute. In a letter dated October 11, 
1985, Mr. R. Phil Ivie admitted: 
Therefore, while we face significant difficulties in 
recovering under the collision portion of your policy 
(convincing the court that the horse-trailer is a motor 
vehicle) it appears to be much easier to claim against the 
liability coverage of the party which struck you, and permit 
them to collect whatever they feel they can through the 
liability portion on the Farmers policy. 
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Mr. Ivie wrote this letter to Mr. and Mrs. Simmons, but also sent a copy to Mr. 
Clayson, ("I am informing Mr. Clayson of this through a carbon copy of this letter"). 
(See Exhibit "E", R. 235). 
Appellants claim that "the insured is entitled to his or her construction of 
the policy provisions and the Utah courts will uphold such a construction." See Utah 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Orville Andrews & Sons. 665 P.2d 1308 (Utah 
1983); American Casualty Co. of Redding. PA v. Eagle Star Insurance Co., 568 P.2d 
731 (Utah 1977); Fuller v. Director of Finance. 694 P.2d 1045, (Utah 1985). (Brief of 
Appellants, at 14). None of these cases holds that, "An insured is entitled to his or her 
construction of the policy provisions." Utah Farm Bureau states: 
Unless there is some ambiguity or uncertainty in an 
insurance policy it should be enforced according to its 
terms; however, where the policy is ambiguous doubt is 
resolved in favor of coverage (citations omitted). 
665 P.2d at 1309. Similarly, American Casualty Co. and Fuller merely state the well 
established rule that ambiguities in an insurance policy are construed against the insurer. 
This rule of construction is inapplicable unless there is ambiguity in the insurance policy; 
otherwise, it is to be enforced according to its terms. 
Appellants' contentions in this area appear to be that it is clear the loss in 
this case is covered by the appellant, Barbara Simmons' insurance policy. (See 
Appellants' Brief, page 10). However, any exclusions or limitations are claimed to be 
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unclear and ambiguous, if they are construed to limit the liability of the insurance 
company to Barbara Simmons for the loss of the horse-trailer. (See Appellants Brief, 
page 16). Such an interpretation is self-serving and unsupported by law. 
C. The plain language of the policy excludes the horse-trailer from liability 
coverage. 
As has been clearly established in defendant's previous motions, there are 
three specific exclusions in the insurance policy that exclude liability coverage for 
damages to the horse-trailer. Yet, counsel for appellants continues to fail to address any 
of them. Instead, he makes only vague reference to possible exclusions: 
Even if there were some term in the policy which proposed 
to exclude coverage in this matter, such a term would be a 
term of adhesion and not enforceable in this action. 
(See Brief of Appellants, page 18). The E-Z Reader Policy clearly excludes from 
liability coverage damage to property that is either being transported by the insured or 
is in the charge of the insured. It is understandable that appellants' counsel is reluctant 
to address the actual language of exclusions numbered 7, 8 and 12 in the Farmers 
Insurance policy. Although appellant was using her private passenger car to tow the 
horse-trailer at issue, the horse-trailer is excluded under these three separate, clearly 
defined exclusions. 
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Exclusion number 7 states: 
This coverage does not apply to: . . . 7. Damage to property 
owned or being transported by an insured person, (emphasis 
added; R. 85). 
The appellant has not disputed, nor could she dispute, that the horse-trailer was being 
transported by her, an insured person. 
Furthermore, exclusion number 8 provides: 
This coverage does not apply to: . . . 8. Damage to 
property rented to or in the charge of an insured person, 
except a residence or private garage not owned by that 
person, (emphasis added; R. 85). 
Similarly, the appellant does not, and cannot, dispute that she is an insured person under 
the policy and that the horse-trailer was in her charge at the time of loss. 
Liability coverage exclusions such as number 7 and 8 of the Farmers 
Insurance E-Z Reader Policy are expressly allowed under the Utah Code: 
Motor vehicle liability coverage need not insure any 
liability . . . resulting from damage to property owned by, 
rented, to bailed to, or transported by the insured, 
(emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-303(3)(c). 
A default judgment entered against Barbara Simmons for the loss of the 
horse-trailer does not specify whether it is based on negligence or breach of contract. 
Marvin Sam Clayson's complaint pled alternate theories of liability. In any event, 
however, exclusion number 12 provides: 
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This coverage does not apply to: . . . 12. Liability 
assumed under any contract or agreement except liability of 
others you assume in a written contract relating to the use 
of an auto you do not own. (R. 85). 
Hence, even if Barbara Simmons contractually agreed to assume liability for any damages 
to the horse-trailer, upon borrowing the trailer from Marvin Sam Clayson, as she has 
alleged, her "contractual" liability is also excluded under the express terms of the policy. 
At no time in the course of this litigation has Barbara Simmons alleged that she entered 
into a written contract with Marvin Sam Clayson concerning an "auto." At best she has 
alleged that she was party to an implicit or oral assumption of liability for damages to 
a horse-trailer. Hence, liability coverage for damage to the horse-trailer was excluded 
under the express terms of the policy, whether Barbara Simmons' alleged liability is 
based on negligence or breach of contract. 
An insurance policy is a contract between the insured and the insurer, the 
language of which should be construed pursuant to the same rules as are applied to other 
ordinary contracts. Words are to be given their usual and ordinary accepted meaning. 
Bergera v. Ideal National Life Insurance Co.. 524 P.2d 599 (Utah 1974). When the 
language of an insurance policy is clear and unambiguous, the contracts must be 
construed within its four corners. 
Not withstanding general recognized principles of strict 
construction, if the terms of the insurance policy are clear 
and unambiguous we interpret those terms in accordance 
with their plain and ordinary meaning. 
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Valley Bank & Trust v. U.S. Life Title Insurance. 776 P.2d 933, 936 (Utah App. 1989). 
Barbara Simmons was provided with the insurance policy which included 
the previous exclusionary provisions. According to the terms of the insurance policy in 
question, it is irrelevant whether the default judgment against Barbara Simmons is based 
on negligence or on an alleged contractual duty to Marvin Sam Clay son. In either view 
Farmers Insurance liability under the policy is expressly excluded. Exclusion number 
7 excludes property being transported by an insured person. Exclusion number 8 
excludes property that is in a charge of an insured person. Exclusion number 12 
excludes contractual assumptions of liability. The language of each of these exclusions 
is clear and unambiguous. Thus the exclusion should be enforced according to the terms. 
When a contract employs clear, ordinary and unambiguous language the exception to the 
general rule for adhesive or ambiguous terms is inapplicable. Big Butte Ranch. Inc. v. 
Holm. 570 P.2d 690 (Utah 1977). As stated by the Utah Supreme Court: 
Inasmuch as insurance coverage is based on contract, unless there 
is some good reason to the contrary (e.g. such as considerations of 
public policy, illegality or unconscionability), we are obliged to 
assume that language included therein was put there for a purpose 
and to give it effect where its meaning is clear and unambiguous. 
Marriott v. Pacific National Life Insurance Co.. 24 Utah 2d 182, 185-186; 467 P.2d 981 
(1970). The mere fact that the parties disagree as to the meaning of the language 
contained in the policy is not sufficient to create an ambiguity. Breuer-Harrison v. 
Combe. 799 P.2d 716, 729 (Utah App. 1990). 
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D. Appellants reliance on the doctrine of "reasonable expectations" is 
misplaced and inaccurate. 
Counsel for appellants argues, in essence, that any exclusion in the policy 
would be adhesive and unenforceable because it would violate Barbara Simmons 
"reasonable expectations." First, even if Barbara Simmons, in fact, expected at the time 
she entered into the insurance contract with Farmers Insurance that a borrowed horse-
trailer would enjoy unlimited coverage under her policy, such expectation is clearly 
unreasonable. The collision portion of her policy clearly provides a $500 limit for such 
coverage and the liability portion of her policy clearly excludes such coverage. A 
reasonable person simply would not have expected an insurance policy provide unlimited 
coverage for the type of damages sustained in this case. Such an unreasonable belief 
could not be a valid basis for ignoring the general rule that, "[u]nless there is some 
ambiguity or uncertainty in the policy it should be enforced according to its terms." 
Utah Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Orville Andrews & Sons. 665 P.2d 1308 
(Utah 1983). The court should be mindful that the "rule of construction favoring the 
insured does not apply in the absence of some ambiguity in the insurance policy 
provisions." Fire Insurance Exchange v. Alsop. 709 P.2d 389, 390 (Utah 1985). 
Second, the appellant's testimony about her expectations is extrinsic to the 
insurance policy and therefore inadmissible except to clarify ambiguity. Again, the 
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exclusions referred to above are clear and unambiguous. Resort to extrinsic evidence is 
hence simply inappropriate. See Utah Valley Bank, 636 P.2d at 1061. 
Third, the appellants' assertion that "an insurance policy is adhesive if it 
does not comply with the reasonable expectation of the insured regardless of the terms 
in the policy which purport to limit such reasonable expectations," is in direct conflict 
with the Utah Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements. Appellants' counsel cites 
only the dissenting opinion in State Farm v. Mastbaum. 748 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1987), 
Justice Durham dissenting, to support this assertion. However, in Allen v. Prudential 
Property, 190 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (1992) the appellant in that case sought to invalidate a 
"household exclusion" in a home owners insurance policy on the grounds that the 
insurance agreement was an adhesion contract and that the existence of the exclusion 
violated her reasonable expectations. The court rejected the "reasonable expectations" 
doctrine stating: 
The fact that an insurance contract is adhesive is no reason 
in itself to enforce what might be found to be the 
reasonable expectations of the insured when those 
expectations conflict with the plain terms of the policy. 
Id. at 10. Hence, even if Barbara Simmons truly expected that a borrowed horse-trailer 
would be fully covered without limitations and even if such expectations were reasonable, 
her expectation would be irrelevant because it conflicts with the plain terms of the 
Farmers Insurance policy. 
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Appellant Barbara Simmons alleges that she expected to have "full 
coverage" and therefore, the policy should cover the damage to the horse-trailer in this 
instance. Her argument is very similar to the argument advanced under the home owners 
policy in Allen. In that case the insured alleged that her husband "told the agent she 
wanted to make sure that 'anyone' who was hurt on the trampoline would be covered." 
Accordingly, she expected the policy to cover her son, who was a member of her 
household. The Supreme Court responded: 
In making this argument Allen asks us to adopt a doctrine that 
considerably modifies the legislative expressed public policy 
underlying the regulation of the insurance industry. The theory 
she advances essentially would allow a court to invalidate a clear 
provision of an insurance contract even if the insured had not read 
it, if the finder of fact is convinced that the insurer's agent knew 
or should have known that the insured had expectations that 
contradicted the policy's language, and that the agent created, or 
helped to create, those expectations. . . . [W]e decline to make 
such a change in Utah law. 
Id. 
The Court noted in Allen that Title 31(A) of the Utah Code provides a 
"comprehensive regulatory frame work for the insurance industry" and that pre-printed 
insurance policies must be filed with the insurance commissioner. The commissioner 
may disapprove of a pre-printed policy at any time if it is found to be "inequitable, 
unfairly discriminatory, misleading, deceptive, obscure or encourages misrepresentation." 
Id. citing Utah Code Ann. §31(A)-22-201(2)(a)(i). 
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Appellants' counsel in this case cites Mastbaum for the proposition that an 
insured's reasonable expectations should be enforced regardless of terms in an insurance 
policy. However, the court in Allen noted that: 
[I]n [Mastbaum] we have reaffirmed the principal of 
deferring to legislative policy regarding the general validity 
of insurance provisions. In that case we upheld the 
household exclusion. . . . [although the insured in 
Mastbaum raised a reasonable expectations argument, four 
members of this court found no reason to address it. 
Allen, 190 Utah Adv. Rep. at 11. Accordingly the appellants' reliance on testimony 
concerning Barbara Simmons "reasonable expectations" is unfounded and in direct 
contradiction of current Utah law. 
Lastly, appellants claim, but fail to substantiate reasons why appellants' 
policy contravenes the Utah Safety Responsibility Act which was in effect at the time of 
the accident. Neither the policy of the Act nor Utah case law requires appellants' 
insurance policy to reimburse the loss of a horse-trailer in the instant case. Such 
reimbursement would be in direct contravention of the clear and unambiguous language 
of the policy. 
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H. FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE COMPLIED WITH ITS IMPLIED 
CONTRACTUAL DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING IN 
ISSUING APPELLANT BARBARA SIMMONS THE POLICY OF HER 
CHOICE AND PROMPTLY PAYING FOR SUCH DAMAGES AS PROVIDED 
FOR THEREIN. 
Appellants' claim that defendant Farmers Insurance acted in bad faith in 
issuing appellant Barbara Simmons a policy with a $500 deductible on a vehicle valued 
at $350 is inappropriate at this time. This issue was not raised in appellants' Complaint 
nor in their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and was not addressed by the lower 
court in the district court's ruling by Judge Christensen. Although there could be a 
variety of reasons why an individual would purchase a policy of this nature, including 
the fact that repairs can often cost more than $500, even on an older vehicle, the fact 
remains that this issue was not raised before this time and is not ripe for discussion now. 
By raising this issue, appellants attempt to cloud the legitimate 
controversies before this court. Appellants do not claim bad faith and refusal to bargain 
or settle as referred to in Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 
1985), but only in offering the policy at all. However, appellants do not expand this 
argument but proceed to insist that Farmers Insurance must realize an additional collision 
risk, i.e. trailers. Appellants then go on to repeat arguments presented in previous 
sections of their brief without addressing the issues of bad faith. 
Appellants claim that "your insured car" is defined as any utility trailer 
while attached to an insured car and "that has never been opposed in this action." 
34 
However, in the lower courts ruling, Judge Christensen points out that appellants' 
construction of the policy language is unreasonable. "The fact that the trailer was 
attached to an automobile does not change the fact that the trailer was still a trailer," 
subject to liability limitations. Appellants' contention that if the trailer is owned by the 
insured or attached to the insured's vehicle it becomes your insured car and no longer 
is viewed as a utility trailer or loses its identity as a trailer is unreasonable and 
contradicts the policy's plain meaning. (R. 7). 
The rest of appellants' contentions in this section only repeat allegations 
made in earlier sections, while refusing to specifically address the exclusions from 
liability stated in numbers 7, 8 and 12 under the appellants' insurance policy. Appellants 
continue in their contention that any exclusion which does not meet the expectations of 
Barbara Simmons is unclear and ambiguous. 
m. BECAUSE THE LIMITS UNDER THE POLICY FOR DAMAGE TO THE 
HORSE-TRAILER IN THIS ACTION WERE $500, FARMERS INSURANCE 
HAD NO DUTY TO DEFEND OR INDEMNIFY APPELLANT BARBARA 
SIMMONS AFTER PAYING HER THE FULL POLICY LIMITS; 
THEREFORE, DECLINING DEFENSE AND INDEMNITY CANNOT, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, CONSTITUTE BAD FAITH. 
The first page of the insurance contract provides, "We will not defend any 
suit, or make additional payments, after we have paid the limit of liability for the 
coverage." (R. 86). This clear limitation on Farmers Insurance duty to defend and make 
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payments under the policy is in harmony with the Insurance Code, Utah Code Ann. 
§31A-22-303(5): 
A policy containing motor vehicle liability coverage 
imposes on the insurer a duty to defend in good faith any 
person insured under the policy against any claim or suit 
seeking damages which would be payable under the policy, 
(emphasis added). 
At the time Marvin Sam Clayson filed suit against Barbara Simmons for damages to his 
horse-trailer, Farmers Insurance had already paid the full limits of its liability for such 
damage. Hence, the damages sought by Marvin Sam Clayson, in the suit, clearly would 
not be "payable under the policy." Therefore, Farmers Insurance had no further duty 
to defend or indemnify Barbara Simmons against such claims. 
Farmers Insurance based it denial of appellants' claims for additional relief 
on the independent advice of legal counsel. On August 15, 1985 attorney Alma Nelson 
rendered to Farmers Insurance his legal opinion that the horse-trailer should qualify as 
a "utility trailer" under the language of the policy and that it "does not qualify as a 
private passenger car, therefore the coverage would be limited to $500." (See Exhibit 
"D", R. 181). "An experts report generally provides a good faith basis for an insurer's 
defense of a bad faith claim." Callioux v. Progressive Insurance Co.. 745 P.2d 838, 842 
(Utah App. 1987). Even though appellants knew that their claims were meritless (see 
letter from Mr. R. Phil Ivie to Mr. and Mrs. Simmons, Exhibit "E", R. 235), they have 
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colluded in their efforts to impose liability on Farmers Insurance. Barbara Simmons has 
testified on deposition as follows: 
Q: (by Mr. Jeffs) Do you know what the arrangements 
that are worked out between you and Mr. Clayson are with 
regard to that judgment and the suit against Farmers 
Insurance? 
A: Just to get Sam a trailer. 
(Deposition of Barbara Simmons, page 37, Exhibit "H", R. 423). 
The fact that Barbara Simmons and Marvin Sam Clayson have engaged in 
a cooperative effort from the beginning of this dispute to "get Sam a trailer" is evident 
from documentary evidence in the admissions of the partys and their counsel. Mr. Ivie 
began his letter of October 11, 1985 to Barbara Simmons stating, "I recently spoke with 
Sam Clayson concerning his claim for reimbursement for the damaged horse-trailer." 
(Exhibit "E", R. 235). In that letter he outlined a course of conduct that appeared to be 
"the route most calculated to obtain recovery for the loss of the horse-trailer" and sent 
a copy of the letter to Marvin Sam Clayson. Id. 
The collusive activity of the appellants is further established by their 
conduct in obtaining a default judgment against Barbara Simmons for the loss of the 
horse-trailer. Apparently, even before service of process James Clark conversed with 
Barbara Simmons, the would-be defendant. Barbara Simmons has testified on deposition: 
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Q: Before you signed that acceptance of service did you 
confer with counsel about the suit that Mr. Clayson had 
brought against you? 
A: I think me and Mr. Clark talked that Sam was going to 
sue me. . . . (emphasis added). 
(See Deposition of Barbara Simmons, page 29, Exhibit "H", R. 423). Barbara Simmons' 
statement that she and James Clark "talked that" Marvin Sam Clayson was going to sue 
her constitutes an implicit admission that she and James Clark planned or agreed that 
Marvin Sam Clayson would sue her. 
Barbara Simmons visited the office of James Clark, the attorney who had 
just filed suit against her, to sign an Acceptance of Service. James Clark personally 
notarized the Acceptance of Service. Then, knowing that her claims against Farmers 
Insurance were frivolous (refer to the letter from Mr. Ivie, Exhibit "E", R. 235), she 
tendered the Complaint and Summons to Farmers Insurance. After receiving a letter 
from Farmers Insurance declining coverage, Barbara Simmons again visited Mr. Clark. 
Mr. Clark testifies that he counselled her to get independent counsel and admits giving 
further legal advice, "I told her that I thought that her counsel's primary concern should 
be with regard to Farmers Insurance denying the defense." (Deposition of James G. 
Clark, page 5, Exhibit "K"; R. 421). Although Mr. Clayson and Ms. Simmons were 
supposedly adversaries in a lawsuit at the time, they apparently both went to Mr. Clark, 
together on this occasion. Mr. Clark has testified, on deposition, that Marvin Sam 
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Clay son was present at all of Mr. Clark's meetings with Barbara Simmons, which took 
place before Mr. Clark had even undertaken formal dual representation. (Deposition of 
James G. Clark, page 10, Exhibit "K"; R. 421). 
Although she had been represented in the claim by R. Phil Ivie, Barbara 
Simmons took no further action to defend herself against the claims asserted against her 
and allowed a default judgment to be entered against her for the loss of the horse-trailer 
(see Default Judgment, R. 204). After the Default Judgment was entered, Barbara 
Simmons and Marvin Sam Clay son together went to Mr. Clark's office to consult with 
him. James Clark then undertook formal representation of Barbara Simmons in 
conjunction with his representation of Marvin Sam Clayson. James Clark admits to 
preparing an agreement by which Barbara Simmons was to "cooperate in her litigation 
on her part and in her own name." No such agreement has been produced by appellants 
or their counsel. (Deposition of James G. Clark, page 7, Exhibit "K"; R. 421). 
Appellants state the position of "Farmers Senior Claims Adjuster" is that 
the utility trailer is defined for all purposes in the insurance policy as "your insured car." 
(See Brief of Appellants, page 10). Farmers Insurance assumes appellants are referring 
to a C.N.C. report dated July 19, 1985 by Harry Watson in which he recommended no 
coverage as a utility trailer. (See C.N.C. Report, Exhibit "L"; R. 286). However, a 
claims adjuster's initial characterization of the facts may only represent investigation into 
different theories of recovery. They are only as binding as a policy allows them to be. 
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A simple reading of the policy definition shows that the horse-trailer is a utility trailer 
since the horse-trailer is "a vehicle designed to be towed by a private passenger car. . 
. ." The defendant therefore justifiably and in good faith relied on the advice of its 
counsel, and not Harry Watson, in characterizing the trailer as a utility trailer. 
Appellants also refer to Mr. Ferrell's deposition and statement that, "we 
improperly denied defense of the law suit." (See Appellant's Brief, page 21). Again, 
a Farmers Insurance claims adjuster does not speak for Farmers Insurance. He has 
neither the authority, nor responsibility, to do so. 
Farmers Insurance has complied with all applicable case law in order to 
make a good faith determination of liability in this case. 
The insurer must make a good faith determination based on 
all the facts known to it or by which reasonable efforts 
could be discovered by it, that there is no potential liability 
under the policy. 
Southgate State Bank & Trust Co. v. United Pacific Insurance Co.. 558 P.2d 486 (Kan. 
1979); Spurill Motors Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co.. 612 P.2d 403, 407 
(1973). This means there are no disputed facts which, if proved by the appellants at 
trial, would result in liability under the policy. Deseret Federal Savings v. United States 
Fidelity & Guarantee. 714 P.2d 1143, 1146-1147 (Utah 1986). 
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Farmers Insurance made a good faith effort to determine liability under the 
policy. Farmers Insurance received guidance from outside counsel and determined it was 
only liable under the collision policy for $500 which it tendered to Ms. Simmons. 
Appellants claim Farmers Insurance has presented absolutely no evidence 
to support its claim that the judgment obtained by Marvin Sam Clayson was excessive. 
However, in Marvin Sam Clay son's deposition he admitted that the $7,000 figure was 
the cost of a new trailer and that the trailer that was destroyed was, in fact, seven years 
old. (See Deposition of Marvin Sam Clayson, page 8-9, Exhibit "J"; R. 422). All the 
facts available to Farmers Insurance indicated their liability was limited to the $500 stated 
above. The fact that appellants' previous counsel, Mr. Ivie, claimed that Farmers 
Insurance was potentially liable does not determine Farmers Insurance liability or 
potential liability, as claimed by appellants in their brief. Contrary to appellants' 
demands, the proper rule has already been complied with by Farmers Insurance in this 
matter, as stated in the policy and the Utah Code. 
IV. TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO 
FARMERS INSURANCE AND RESOLVED ALL ISSUES. 
A. Appellants claims are contradictory and inconsistent. 
Appellants have perplexed Farmers Insurance with their contradictory 
claims on this issue. Early in the dispute, appellants made a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment implying that not all issues could be resolved by summary judgment at that 
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time. However, later in Appellants' Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, appellants made no mention of the fact that summary judgment should not be 
granted because it did not address all of the issues in appellants' Complaint. After the 
lower court issued the summary judgment for Farmers Insurance, appellants made no 
attempt to reset a trial date for the remaining issues or to attempt to resolve those issues 
in any fashion. In fact, when Farmers Insurance filed a Motion to Dismiss Appellants' 
appeal because all the issues had not been addressed, the appellants filed a motion in 
opposition stating, "[t]his case has been dismissed for all claims." (See Appellant's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Appeal and Request for 
Oral Arguments, page 3). Also on page 4 appellants claim: 
No claims remain to be determined regarding the agency 
actions of Randall L. Tuckett. Since no claims remain to 
be litigated in the district court, the Order by the district is 
a final appealable order pursuant to Rule 54b. 
Appellants also take the position that the question of whether or not there 
is final order is a question of law to be determined by the appellate court. "Since all 
issues as to all parties in this action have been resolved, the Summary Judgment Order 
issued by the district court is a final appealable order. . . . " (Id. at 5). Appellants 
further state: 
[N]o issues remain in the district court personally against Randall 
L. Tuckett. . . . Since all claims against Farmers Insurance have 
been dismissed this would include claims against anyone acting as 
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their agent; therefore no claims remain pending in the district court 
regarding Randall L. Tuckett. 
(Id. at 5). 
Now in appellants brief, appellants claim the court dismissed all claims of 
the appellants but failed to address alternative causes of action. Appellants claim that 
issues involving Randall Tuckett's negligence and fraud and fraud of Farmers Insurance 
are still pending and need to be litigated, and that because of these facts, summary 
judgment for Farmers Insurance was inappropriate. 
Appellee is in a quandary to determine how to address appellants' 
allegations. Appellee has already argued in its Motion for Summary Dismissal of the 
Appeal, that all the issues have not been resolved in the lower courts and, therefore, this 
case was not ripe for appeal. However, appellants opposed that action. The trial court's 
grant of summary judgment for Farmers Insurance Exchange was correct and 
appropriate. Any issues unresolved were ignored by appellants and are now moot. 
In reference to appellants' claim against Farmers Insurance agent, Randall 
L. Tuckett, no separate consideration was given to Mr. Tuckett to act as an additional 
insurer. "Where no separate fee or consideration is given there can be no separate 
obligation arising apart from the . . . insurance contract." New West Federal Savings 
& Loan v. Guardian Title Co.. 818 P.2d 585, 589 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Anderson 
v. Title Insurance Co.. 655 P.2d 82, 85 (Idaho 1982). Appellant, Barbara Simmons, 
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paid no separate fee to Randall Tuckett. Therefore, he has no obligation or liability apart 
from the contract. 
Regarding appellants' allegations that Farmers Insurance was fraudulent, 
because the policy did not have "full coverage," appellant had full opportunity to argue 
and litigate those issues while in the lower courts and chose not to do so. The obligation 
is upon appellants to prosecute their case. (Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 41). Any 
deficiency in appellants' case is due to lack of diligence on the part of appellants and 
their counsel. Appellee should not be sanctioned for their oversight. 
B. Farmers Insurance Exchange correctly sought and received an Order for Summary 
Judgment. 
Under the insurance policy purchased by appellant, Barbara Simmons, a 
horse-trailer is a utility trailer not owned by her with a $500 limit on liability which was 
paid by defendant, Farmers Insurance Exchange. The horse-trailer clearly meets the 
policy definition of a utility trailer. Though arguably part of "your insured car," the 
trailer is still a trailer and subject to the liability limitations in the policy. The trial court 
correctly interpreted appellants' manipulation of these terms as unreasonable and 
contradictory to the policy's plain meaning (R. 405). Having paid the policy limits, the 
trial court also realized Farmers Insurance Exchange was under no further obligation to 
defend appellant Barbara Simmons against appellant Marvin Sam Clayson's claim for 
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damages (R. 400). Farmers Insurance, in fact, acted in good faith in relying on the 
advice of counsel in making prompt payment to appellant Barbara Simmons. 
The horse-trailer is not a private passenger car as defined by the policy. 
The trial court correctly analyzed the distinction between a private passenger car and the 
trailer by observing that a land motor vehicle would, at the very least, require a motor. 
Further, a search through the Utah Code is unnecessary and creates ambiguity when, 
under the ordinary meaning in the policy, a land motor vehicle does not include a 
motorless horse-trailer. 
The trial court also correctly recognized that exclusions 7 and 8 of a policy 
apply to appellants' horse-trailer. Since the trailer was clearly property transported by 
the insured and in her charge, it was excluded from liability under the policy (R. 403). 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly rejected the "reasonable expectation 
doctrine" in Allen v. Prudential Property, 190 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (1992), and the trial 
court correctly perceived this in its ruling. Even if appellants' expectations had been 
reasonable, the court saw the analogy between Allen and this case and correctly rejected 
appellants' claims on this basis. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Fourth District Court correctly granted Fanners Insurance's Motion 
for Summary Judgment in this matter. Appellees seek to have that judgment affirmed. 
DATED AND SIGNED t h i s / ^ S a y of June, 1993. 
M. DAYLE JEpFS 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
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following: 
Mr. James G. Clark, Esq. 
96 East 100 South 
Provo, UT 84606 
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J u l y 19 , 1985 
D A L L A S H . Y O U N O ( 1 6 0 2 - 1 0 7 1 ) 
T E L E P H O N E 373 -SOOO 
AREA CODE SOI 
Mr. Harry Watson 
Farmers Insurance Exchange 
P. 0. Box 480 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Re: Your Insured: 
Date of Loss: 
Doug and Barbara Simmons 
May 11, 1985 
Dear Harry: 
As I advised you on the phone, I have been 
contacted by Doug Simmons regarding his collision claim 
with Farmers Insurance. After reviewing his policy of 
insurance it appears that he is entitled to full 
compensation for the property loss sustained in the 
accident of May 11, 1985. 
As you indicated on the phone, it is Farmers' 
position that the damaged property does not constitute 
a "utility trailer" as defined by Farmers1 policy. 
Accepting your position in that regard merely for the 
sake of argument, it appears that the damaged property 
is clearly a "private passenger car" as that term is 
defined in Farmers' E-Z-Reader Car Policy. 
As you should be aware, Coverage G of your insured's 
policy provides: 
"We will pay for loss to your insured car 
caused by collision less any applicable 
deductibles." 
"Your insured car" is defined under Coverage G to 
mean: 
"As used in this part: 
(3) . Your insured car shall include any other 
private passenger car, utility car, or utility 
trailer not owned by or furnished or available for 
the regular use of you or a family member. Bu 
"f^tElVBD 
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Mr. Harry Watson 
July 19, 1985 
Page 2 
vehicle shall be considered as your insured car unless 
there is sufficient reason to believe that the use is 
with permission of the owner, and unless it is used by 
you or a family member." 
"Private passenger car" is defined in Farmers' 
policy to mean: 
"a four wheel land motor vehicle of the private 
passenger or station wagon type actually licensed 
for use upon public highways. It includes any 
motor home with no more than six wheels and not 
used for business purposes." 
Under this policy language, it is clear that full 
coverage must be extended. The damaged property had 
exactly four wheels and was licensed for use upon 
public highways. The definition of "private passenger 
car" therefore encompasses the damaged property. The 
definition also indicates that a private passenger car 
means "a . . . motor vehicle of the private passenger . 
. . type". While this appears clearly redundant, my 
understanding of the vehicle is that it is designed for 
passenger use. Apparently, horses have been passengers 
in this vehicle for quite some time. Furthermore, 
there is a compartment in the front of the vehicle for 
human passengers. I am enclosing a copy of the vehicle's 
registration to constitute sufficient proof that the 
vehicle was licensed for use upon public highways. 
In addition to the vehicle falling squarely within 
the definition of "private passenger car", the other 
requirements for finding the vehicle to be "your 
insured car" under the policy are also met. The 
vehicle was not owned by or furnished or available for 
the regular use of your insured or a family member 
(living in the same residence as the insured). This 
was the first occasion where your insured had used the 
vehicle, and it was clearly not furnished or available 
for the insured's regular use. The owner of the 
vehicle is a distant cousin who does not reside in the 
same household as your insured. Furthermore, there is 
no dispute that your insured had permission to use the 
vehicle on the occasion when it was damaged. 
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Mr. Harry Watson 
July 19, 1985 
Page 3 
Because the vehicle qualifies as a "private 
passenger car" under the definition in your policy of 
"your insured car", the limit of liability relating to 
utility trailers would also not apply. This is 
particularly so where Farmers has now maintained for 
two months that the vehicle is not a "utility trailer". 
I would not imagine that any court would allow Farmers 
to argue that they are entitled to both definitions, 
particularly where they drafted the policy. Therefore, 
I believe that the Simmons are entitled to the lowest 
of "(1) the actual cash value of the . . . damaged 
property, or (2) the amount necessary to repair or 
replace the property or parts with other like, kind and 
quality, less depreciation." 
I of course realize that it takes some rather 
complicated legal reasoning to determine the character 
of the damaged property under the terms used by Farmers 
in their E-Z Reader policy. Perhaps Farmers may be 
interested in drafting a E-Z-R Reader Policy where 
their insureds could determine themselves, without 
legal assistance, what is covered and what is not. 
However, this construction is certainly a legitimate 
one and your insureds have been under the impression 
that such property would be covered when they purchased 
the policy of insurance. 
As I am sure you are aware, because insurance 
companies can select whatever terms they choose in 
drafting a policy of insurance, the courts of this and 
other states strictly construe any ambiguities against 
the insurance company. Certainly, this is the only 
fair method of construing these policies. Where 
Farmers has failed to use definite terms that explain 
their rights and liabilities under the policy of 
insurance, the insured is certainly entitled to their 
construction of the policy provisions and the Utah 
Courts will uphold such a construction. See Utah Farm 
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company vs. Orville Andrews & 
Sons, dba Nebo Black Angus Ranch, et al, Supreme Court 
No. 18239, filed June 10, 1983. 
Under the construction and theories issued above, 
I certainly expect Farmers to make prompt payment of 
this collision loss. Please be aware that the long 
delay in settling this claim has worked an economic 
hardship upon your insureds. If it is necessary to go 
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Mr. Harry Watson 
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to court to enforce my clients1 rights under this 
action, I would certainly expect that a claim pursuant 
to Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange would be appropriate. 
While I am certain Farmers is familiar with the Beck 
case, I enclose a copy of that recent decision for your 
benefit. 
Thank you for your cooperation. I look forward to 
your prompt remittance of the benefits owing to my 
clients under their policy of insurance. 
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P.S. Harry—Since writing this letter I reviewed my 
legal reasoning with Ray, and while he concurs 
with my conclusions, he believes that Farmers may 
try and claim that the horse-trailer is not a 
"motor vehicle" as that term is used in your 
definition of "private passenger car". After 
discussing this point, we of course came to the 
conclusion that the Utah Courts, in determining 
the meaning of words used in an insurance policy, 
and yet not defined, will apply any reasonably 
acceptable definition of the term which the 
insured may rely upon. Assuming that the Utah 
legislature may be considered "reasonable"/ it is 
interesting to note that they have defined the 
term "motor vehicle" in Section 31-41-3, Utah Code 
Annotated, to mean any vehicle of a kind required 
to be registered under Title 41, but excluding, 
however, motorcycles. Because the horse-trailer ^ ''%v^'* 
is required to be registered, it falls within the ^ \'y 
definition of motor vehicle as used in the Act. J 
Clearly, the insured is entitled to rely upon that 
definition since Farmers has not provided a 
separate definition of the term in their K-Z 
Reader policy. 
It is also important to note that Dairyland vs.
 m 
Smith, provides that the definitions of the >< 
no-fault policy are adopted into the provisions of ^ 
the Safety Responsibility Act. See Dairy]and vs. ~ 
Smith, 646 P.2d 737.
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EXHIBIT No. 0 
EXHIBIT "C" 
Loss caused by missiles falling objects fi heft or larceny 
explosion earthquake, windstorm hail, water, flood, malicious 
mischief or vandalism not or civil commotion, colliding with a 
bird or animal or breakage of glass is not deemed loss caused 
by collision. If breakage of glass results from a collision, you 
may elect to have it treated as loss caused by collision. 
Coverage G — Collision 
We will pay for loss to your insured car caused by collision less 
any applicable deductibles 
Any deductible shall apply separately to each loss. 
Coverage H — Towing and Road Service 
We will pay for reasonable and necessary towing and labor costs 
incurred because of disablement of your insured car. The labor 
must be performed at the place of disablement 
Additional Definitions Used In This Part Only 
As used in this part 
1 Collision means collision of your insured car with another 
object or upset of your insured car. 
2 Loss means direct and accidental loss of or damage to your 
insured car, including its equipment 
3 Your insured car shall also include any other private passen-
ger car, utility car, or utility trailer not owned by or furnished 
or available for the regular use of you or a family member. But no 
vehicle shall be considered as your insured car unless there is 
sufficient reason to believe that the use is with permission of the 
owner, and unless it is used by you or a family member. 
Supplementary Payments 
1 If you have comprehensive coverage, we will pay for trans-
portation expenses incurred by you because of the total theft of 
your insured car. We will pay up to $15 per day, but no more 
than $450 This coverage begins 48 hours after the theft has 
been reported to Us and to the police and ends when the car is 
returned to use or when we offer settlement fo* the loss. 
2 We wilf &ay up to, but not more than, $200 for loss of 
clothing OP luggage in your insured car and belonging to you or a 
family member if the loss is caused by 
a Collision of your insured car while covered by this policy 
b Fire", lightning flood, earthquake, explosion, falling air-
craft, or theft of the entire insured car, and loss occurs to 
your insured car from the same cause while covered for 
comprehensive by this policy 
Exclusions 
This coverage does not apply to loss: 
1 To your insured car while used to carry persons or property 
for a charge This exclusion does not apply to shared-expense 
car pools 
2 Caused by war (declared or undeclared), civil war, insurrec-
tion, rebellion, revolution, nuclear reaction, radiation or radio-
active contamination, or any consequence of any of these 
3 Caused by theft to equipment designed for the reproduction 
of sound, or any radio receiving or radio receiving and transmit-
ting equipment This applies to such equipment as a tape player, 
tape recorder, citizens band radio and two-way mobile radio, 
telephone, television or scanning monitor receiver It also ap-
plies to any electronic device incorporating any of this equip-
ment, as well as accessories and antennas 
This exclusion does not apply to that equipment which is perma-
9 During any organi. jr agreed-upon racing or speed contest 
or demonstration in which your insured car has active participa-
tion, or in practice or preparation for any such contest 
10 To a van, pickup, or panel truck due to increased cost of 
repair or replacement of the following furnishings or equipment 
a special carpeting insulation, wall paneling furniture or 
bars 
b facilities for cooking and sleeping including enclosures or 
bathroom facilities 
c height-extending roofs 
d murals, paintings or other decals or graphics 
Limits of Liability 
Our limits of liability for loss shall not exceed the lowest of 
1 The actual cash value of the stolen or damaged property 
2 The amount necessary to repair or replace the property or 
parts with other of like kind and quality, less depreciation 
3 $500 for a utility trailer not owned by you or a family 
member. 
Payment of Loss 
We may pay the loss in money or repair or replace damaged or 
stolen property We may, at any time before the loss is paid or 
the property is replaced, return, at our expense, any stolen 
property either to you or to the address shown in the Declara-
tions, with payment for the resulting damage We may keep all 
or part of the property at the agreed or appraised value 
Appraisal 
You or we may demand appraisal of the loss. Each will appoint 
and pay a competent and disinterested appraiser and will equally 
share other appraisal expenses The appraisers, or a judge of a 
court having jurisdiction, will select an umpire to decide any 
differences Each appraiser will state separately the actual casn 
value and the amount of loss. An award in writing by any two 
appraisers will determine the amount payable, which shall be 
binding subject to the terms of this insurance 
No Benefit to Bailee 
This coverage shall not directly or indirectly benefit any carrier or 
other bailee for hire liable for loss to your insured car. 
Other Insurance 
If there is other applicable similar insurance on any other policy 
that applies to a loss covered by this part, we will pay only our 
share Our share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears 
to the total of all applicable limits This coverage does not apply 
to any substitute or non-owned car if there is similar coverage 
on it 
Any insurance we provide for a vehicle you do not own shall be 
excess over any other collectible insurance 
If any applicable insurance other than this policy is issued to you 
by us or any other member company of the Farmers Insurance 
Group of Companies, the total amount payable among all such 
policies shall not exceed the limits provided by the single policy 
with the highest limits of liability 
PART V —CONDITIONS 
1. Policy Period and Territory 
This policy applies only to accidents, occurrences, and losses 
during the policy period shown in the Declarations which occur 
within the United States, its territories or possessions, or 
Canada, or while the car is being shipped between their ports 
AGREEMENT 
We agree with you in return (or your pi «uum payment, to 
insure you subject to all the terms of this policy We will insure 
you for the coverages and the limits of liability shown in the 
Declarations ol this policy 
DEFINITIONS 
Throughout this policy you and your mean the named 
insured' shown in the Declarations and spouse if a resident of 
the same household We ' us" and our mean the Com-
pany named in the Declarations which provides this insurance 
In addition, certain words appear in bold type They are defined 
as follows 
Accident or occurrence means a sudden event including con-
tinuous or repeated exposure to the same conditions, resulting 
in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intend-
ed by the insured person 
Bodily injury means bodily injury to or sickness disease or 
death of any person 
Damages are the cost of compensating those who suffer bodily 
injury or property damage from an accident. 
Family member means a person related to you by blood, mar-
riage or adoption who is a resident of your household 
Occupying means in, on, getting into or out of 
Private Passenger Car means a four wheel land motor vehicle of 
the private passenger or station wagon type actually licensed for 
use upon public highways It includes any motor home with no 
more than six wheels and not used for business purposes 
Property damage means physical injury to or destruction of 
tangible property including loss of its use 
State means the District of Columbia and any state territory or 
possession of the United States of any province of Canada 
Utility car means a land motor vehicle having at least four 
wheels actually licensed for use upon public highways, with a 
rated load capacity of not more than 2,000 pounds, of the 
pickup, panel or van type This does not mean a vehicle used in 
any business or occupation other than farming or ranching 
However, it dpes include a newly acquired or replacement vehicle 
of* the same type if (ts usage is the same as the utility car 
described in the Declarations 
Utility trailer means a vehicle designed to be towed by a private 
passenger car and includes a farm wagon or farm implement 
while towed by a private passenger car or utility car. It does not 
include a trailer used as an office, store, display or passenger 
trailer. 
Your insured car means* 
1 The vehicle described in the Declarations of this policy or any 
private passenger car or utility car with which you replace it. 
You must advise us within 30 days of any change of private 
passenger car or utility car. If your policy term ends more than 
30 days after the change, you can advise us anytime before the 
end of that term 
2 Any additional private passenger car or utility car of which 
you acquire ownership during the policy period Provided that* 
a You notify us within 30 days of its acquisition, and 
b As of the date of acquisition, all private passenger and 
utility cars you own are insured with a member company 
of the Farmers Insurance Group of Companies 
Ownership shall include the written leasing of a private passen-
ger or utility car for a continuous period of at least six months 
3 Any utility trailer: 
a. That you own, or 
b. While attached to your insured car. 
2 Send us prompt ny legal papers received relating to any 
claim or suit 
3 Submit to physical examinations at our expense by doctors 
we select as often as we may reasonably require 
4 Authorize us to obtain medical and other records 
5 Provide any written proofs of loss we require 
6 Notify police within 24 hours and us witljin 30 days if a hit and 
run motorist is involved and an uninsured motorist claim is to be 
filed 
7 If claiming car damage coverage 
a Take reasonable steps after loss to protect the vehicle and 
its equipment from further loss We will pay reasonable 
expenses incurred in providing that protection 
b Promptly report the theft of the vehicle to the police 
c Allow us to inspect and appraise the damaged vehicle 
before its repair or disposal 
8 Submit to examination under oath upon our request 
PART I — LIABILITY 
Coverage A — Bodily Injury 
Coverage B — Property Damage 
We will pay damages for which any insured person is legally 
liable because of bodily injury to any person and property dam-
age arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a pri-
vate passenger car, a utility car, or a utility trailer 
We will defend any claim or suit asking for these damages We 
may settle when we consider it appropriate 
We will not defend any suit or make additional payments after we 
have paid the limit of liability for the coverage 
Additional Definitions Used In This Part Only 
Insured person as used in this part means 
1 You or any family member. 
2 Any person using your insured car. 
3 Any other person or organization with respect only to legal 
liability for acts or omissions of 
a Any person covered under this part while using your in-
sured car. 
b You or any tamily member covered under this part while 
using any private passenger car, utility car, or utility 
trailer otner than your insured car if not owned or hired 
by that person or organization. 
Insured person does not mean. 
1 The United States of America or any of its agencies 
2. Any person for bodily injury or property damage arising 
from the operation of a vehicle by that person as an employee of 
the United States Government when the provisions of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act apply 
3 Any person who uses a vehicle without having sufficient 
reason to believe that the use is with permission of the owner 
Your insured car as used in this part shall also include any 
other private passenger car, utility car, or utility trailer not 
owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or a 
family member. But no vehicle shall be considered as your 
insured car unless there is sufficient reason to believe that the 
use is with permission of the owner, and unless it is used by you 
or a family member. 
S u p p l e m e n t a r y P a y m e n t s 
In addition to our limit of liability, we will pay these benefits as 
respects an insured person: 
EXHIBIT "D" 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
ROBERT BAYLE 
DN J H A N S O N 
<RON ALMA N E L S O N 
) M N M C H I P M A N 
JOREA C ALCABES 
A T T O R N E Y S A N D C O U N S E L O R S A T L A W 
S U I T E 1 3 0 0 C O N T I N E N T A L B A N K B L M L D i N G 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
( S O U 3 6 4 - 3 6 2 7 
August 1 5 , 1985 
Mr. Ellis P. Ferrell 
Branch Claims Manager 
Farmers Insurance Group 
P.O. Box 480 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Re: Barbara Simmons 
Policy No. 76 11538 70 79 
D/L: 5/11/85 
Dear Mr. Ferrell: 
i A V L t M U R O 6. L A U C H N O R 
i 963 - i©6© 
BAYLE & L A U C M N O R 
1 9 7 0 1 9 7 6 
D A Y L C C H I L D 6. R I T C H I C 
( 9 7 9 
" K ^ IE HOWELL & C^ 
t 9 B O - l 9 6 i 
H A N S O N 6. N E L S O N 
1 9 7 6 - 1 9 6 1 
Pursuant to your request, we have reviewed the file 
on the above claim and the policy. We are assuming that 
the policy in question is the Farmers E-Z-Reader Car Policy, 
First Edition 9-8-84 Policy or a policy with identical 
language. 
After reviewing the file and the policy it is our 
opinion that a Court would probably hold that the horse 
trailer qualified as a "utility trailer" under the terms of 
the policy but it does not qualify as a "private passenger 
car." Therefore, the coverage would be limited to $500.00. 
The policy provides that coverage G-collision coverage 
applies to loss to "your insured car." "Your insured car" 
under the collision coverage is defined as follows: 
3. Your insured car shall also include 
any other private passenger car, utility car, 
or utility trailer not owned by or furnished 
or available for the regular use of you or a 
family member. But no vehicle shall be con-
sidered as your insured car unless there is a 
sufficient reason to believe that the use is 
with permission of the owner and unless it is 
used by you or a family member. (emphasis 
supplied in policy) 
Mr. Ellis P. Ferrell 
Re: Barbara Simmons 
Page 2 
August 15, 1985 
The general definitions of the policy include the 
following: 
Private passenger car means a four-wheel 
land motor vehicle of the private passenger 
or station wagon type actually licensed for use 
upon public highways. It includes any motor home 
with no more than six wheels and not used for 
business purposes. 
Utility trailer means a vehicle designed to 
be towed by a private passenger car and includes 
a farm wagon or farm implement while towed by a 
private passenger car or utility car . It does not 
include the trailer used as an office, store, display 
or passenger trailer. 
While it can be argued that the term "utility trailer" is 
not intended to include a horse trailer, we believe the Court 
would hold that the definition of utility trailer is broad 
enough to inlcude a horse trailer. Therefore, we believe the 
coverage for utility trailers would apply. The policy limits 
coverage for a utility trailer to $500.00. 
We do not believe the horse trailer would qualify as a 
"private passenger car" under the terms of the policy. The policy 
very clearly states that a private passenger car must be "a four 
wheel land motor vehicle." The horse trailer may have four wheels 
but it is certainly not a motor vehicle. We do not believe a Court 
could stretch the meaning of the policy to such an extent as to 
call a horse trailer a private passenger car. 
You and the insured1s attorney have made several references 
to the requirements of the Utah Code. We do not believe the 
cited provisions of the Utah Code have anything to do with collision 
coverage. 
It is our opinion that you have taken the correct 
position regarding coverage in extending $500.00 coverage for 
the horse trailer as a "utility trailer" but denying coverage 
above that amount. 
The insured's attorney has requested that you pay the 
$500.00 without limiting the insured's right to bring an 
action for additional coverage. I believe you should comply 
? 
Mr. Ellis P. Ferrell 
Re: Barbara Simmons 
Page 3 
August 15, 1985 
with that request. If you have not already done so, please 
send a letter to the insured's attorney that by accepting the 
$500.00 the insured will not waive any further rights he may 
have against Farmers Insurance Exchange to recover additional 
amounts under the policy. 
Please let us know if you have any other questions. 
Very truly yours, 
AAN-.pkb 
EXHIBIT "E" 
RAY HARDING IVIE 
DALLAS H YOUNG JR. 
BRENT O YOUNG 
JERRY L REYNOLDS 
RAY PHILLIPS IVIE 
SHERMAN C YOUNG 
LAW OFFICES 
I V I E A N D Y O U N G 
46 NORTH UNIVERSITY AVENUE 
P O BOX 672 
PROVO. UTAH 8 4 6 0 3 
October 1 1 , 1985 
DALLAS M.YOUNG ( 1892-1971 ) 
TELEPHONE 3 7B-»OO0 
AREA CODE BOl 
Mr. and Mrs. Doug Simmons 
3210 West 6400 South 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Simmons 
<y> 
I recently spoke with Sam Clayson concerning his 
claim for reimbursement for the damaged horse-trailer. 
After some consideration, it occurred to me that he 
would have an excellent right of recovery against the 
party who ran into you. Unlike the case that you are 
presently involved in, there is no question of compara-
tive negligence in such a situation. Mr. Clayson was 
not at the scene and I cannot foresee a claim of 
negligence on his part. If the people who are suing 
you are even one percent negligent, then they would be 
responsible for the entire damage to the trailer. They 
may have a claim back against you if they contend that 
you were negligent, but this should definitely be 
covered under the liability portion of your Farmers 
policy. 
Therefore, while we face significant difficulties 
in recovering under the collision portion of your 
policy (convincing the court that the horse-trailer is 
a motor vehicle), it appears to be much easier to claim 
against the liability coverage of the party which 
struck you, and permit them to collect whatever they 
feel they can through the liability portion on the 
Farmers policy. 
Accordingly, I believe that the case can best be 
handled in this manner, either through direct contact 
with Allstate Insurance, the company insuring the 
people that hit you, and if necessary, raising the 
claim in the Arizona case through the attorney that 
Farmers has appointed to represent you. 
I am informing Mr. Clayson of this through a 
carbon copy of this letter. He may make direct contract 
with the Allstate adjuster by writing him at 6135 North 
Black Canyon Highway, Phoenix, Arizona 85015, and 
referring to Claim No. 224-347-133-7G77. 
Mr. and Mrs. Doug Simmons 
October 11, 1985 
Page 2 
Because this appears to be the route most calculated 
to obtain recovery for the loss to the horse-trailer, 
and because you would need to go through the Arizona 
attorney if Allstate is unwilling to settle the claim 
without litigation, I will be closing my file at this 
time. However, if I can assist you any further in this 
matter, or in any other matters, do not hesitate to 
contact me. If you have any questions concerning the 
manner in which I recommend that you proceed, please 
give me a call. 
Yours truly, 
RAY PHILLIPS IVIE 
m 
RPI:lb § 
cc: Sam Clayson 22 
>3-i 
EXHIBIT "F" 
M. Dayle Jeffs, #1655 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
Attorneys at Law, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA L. SIMMONS and MARVIN | 
SAM CLAYSON, 
| AFFIDAVIT OF JON V. TOPOL 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ! 
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP, d/b/a j 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Civil No. CV-88-915 
RANDALL L. TUCKETT (agent) AND J 
JOHN DOES 1 through 5, Judge C. Y. Christensen 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, Jon V. Topol, based upon my personal knowledge and under oath testify as follows: 
1. That I am the Provo branch claims Manager for Farmers Insurance Exchange. 
2. That Farmers Insurance hired counsel to defend Barbara Simmons against claims 
asserted against her in an Arizona lawsuit based upon the same accident at issue in this present 
cause of action against Farmers Insurance. (See copy of Complaint attached hereto and by 
reference made a part hereof). 
3. That Farmers Insurance has resolved all claims asserted against Barbara Simmons 
in the Arizona cause of action and has paid in excess of $66,000.00 to settle bodily injury claims 
and in excess of $19,000.00 for property damage arising from the collision. 
DATED and signed this ^ day of June, 1992. 
^ycy\l ' ^-*-£*xL-
Jon V. Topol 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2 ^ b day of June, 1992. 
- = L ^ ,voJfc <\A < Cc^\ 
Notary Public 
Residing at Qven\ \{\z>\r\ 
2 
EXHIBIT "G" 
LAW OFFICES OF CARL M. TOOTLE, Esq. 
LAW OFFICES OF JACOB LEON SIKEN, Esq. 
1220 Arizona Bank Plaza 
33 North Stone Avenue 
Tucson, Arizona B5701 
602/622-4993 
PCC #57540 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA 
DONNA M. SIMPSON, a married 
woman, in her sole and sepa-
rate right; GLEN SHARP, a 
single man, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs . -
BARBARA L. SIMMONS and "JOHN 
DOE" SIMMONS, husband and 
wife; JOHN DOES 2-10; JANE 
DOES 1-10; ABC CORPORATIONS 
1-10; XYZ PARTNERSHIPS 1-10, 
Defendants. 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIMA - 7
y<3 - ?3S~/ 
NO. 
22KJ08 
COMPLAINT 
(Tort - Motor Vehicle) 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs, and for their cause of action 
against Defendants allege as follows: 
I 
Tli.it Defendants presently identified v^ ith fictitious nc-MTies 
are Defendants whose na'i.Oo are presently unknown to Plaintiffs, 
arid lecjve is requested to insert their true names when the sarie 
recoire known t^ Plaintiffs. Th it <;t all times mentioned herein, 
* ^ • » i v. • 1 ( r , ( > f 11, M I I • d ! v f t > I / . « p t ', W i » » • » f O I 
t i n i r r e s n e c t : v c r' i r I t cd ( OHIMIUM I • u s . 
.nd or' b« hd If o f 
. ' U , 
^<£? CO 
II 
That Plaintiff DONNA M. SIMPSON is a resident of Pima 
County, Arizona; that Plaintiff GLEN SHARP is a resident of 
Mohave County, Arizona; and that, upon information and belief, 
Defendants SIMMONS reside without the State of Arizona. The 
remaining Defendants' residences are unknown. 
Ill 
That, upon information and belief, at all times herein 
mentioned Defendants were the owners and/or operators of certain 
motor vehicles within the State of Arizona. 
IV 
That on or about May 11, 1985, at or about 11:00 p.m., 
Defendants were operating certain motor vehicles on Highway 93 
at or near milepost 250 in the State of Arizona. 
V 
That at the time and place mentioned herein Plaintiffs were 
passengers in the motor vehicle operated by ERNEST HAGGEMAN, and 
as a direct and proximate result of the negligence, carelessness 
and recklessness of Defendants, Plaintiffs sustained serious and 
permanent personal injuries, the nature and extent of which are 
not presently known. 
VI 
That at said time and place Defendants negligently, 
recklessly, carelessly, in .in unlawful manner and without due 
caution and circumspection, opii.it rij said motor vehicles so as 
to erase the vehicle in which Plaintiffs were passengers to 
p ROVO 8C0 
1 
2| 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
101 
11 
121 
13 
14 
15 
161 
171 
18 
19| 
20| 
21 
2 2 J 
23, 
24 
25! 
26, 
27 j 
28 ! 
strike or be struck by one or more? other motor vehicles operated 
by Defendants. 
VI I 
That Defendants were careless and negligent in that they 
operated their motor vehicles: (a) so negligently and carelessly 
so as to cause the vehicle in which Plaintiffs DONNA M. SIMPSON 
and GLEN SHARP were passengers to strike or be struck by one or 
more other motor vehicles, which conduct was in violation of and 
contrary to the laws of the State; (b) at a dangerous, excessive 
and unlawful rate of speed and in a manner so as to endanger the 
life and limb of the Plaintiffs; (c) at a speed which was 
greater than was reasonable and prudent under the circumstances 
then and there existing, and in violation of the law; (d) in 
such a manner that they failed to keep the vehicle under 
control, which conduct was in violation of and contrary to the 
laws of the State. 
VIII 
Defendants were negligent in other ways not herein set 
forth in detail. The carelessness and negligence of said 
Defendants in the manner und under such circumstances as 
aforesaid, were the sole and proximate cause of the vehicle in 
which Plaint iffs wure passengers striking or being struck by 
other motor vehicles. 
IX 
That as a further proximate result of the neoligcnce of 
Defendants, Plaintiffs have incurred expenses for medical 
SCO 
p»ov<-
treatment and Plaintiffs have boon ciuscd great bodily pain and 
suffering, and will so continue to suffer such pain for a long 
time to come; that they are still under the care of physicians 
and it is believed that their injuries are lasting and permanent 
in nature, and that they will be required to continue under the 
treatment of physicians for a long period of time to come; that 
by reason thereof, said Plaintiffs have suffered great and 
grievous mental and physical pain and anguish, and will continue 
so to suffer for a long period of time; that by reason of said 
injuries, Plaintiffs have further lost wages and employment 
opportunities; and that the total amount of their medical 
expenses, lost wages, and other damages is unknown at this 
time. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that judgment be duly entered 
herein against the Defendants, and each of them, jointly and 
severally, in such amounts as are just and equitable for the 
personal injuries sustained, the damage to their property, for 
lost wages incurred, for other damages sustained, for their 
costs including reasonable attorney fees, and for such other and 
further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 
DATED this ""^day of June, 1985 
GARVIN W.^IDELN for 
CARD M. TOOTLE 
Attorney for Pl.iint iffs 
P&OVO 8C0 
ARIZONA SUPERIOR COURT, PIMA COUNTY 
aintiff 
NNA M. SIMPSON and 
tn SHARP 
fendant 
FBARA L . SIMMONS a n d 
Dim DOE" SIMMONS, h / w ; 
IN DOES 2 - 1 0 ; JANE DOES 1 -
; Gt al. 
NO. 225,'i08 
CIVIL SUMMONS 
: STATE OF ARIZONA to the above-named Defendant "John Doe" Siminons 
A lawsuit has been filed against you. 
If you do not want a Judgment taken against you for the relief 
demanded in the accompanying Complaint, you must file a Response 
in writing in the Office of the Clerk of the Superior Court, 
111 West Congress, Tucson, Arizona, accompanied by the necessary 
filing fee. A copy of the Response must also be mailed to the 
plaint iff/attorney whose name appears below. 
The Response must be filed within TWENTY DAYS, exclusive of the 
date of service, if served within the State of Arizona, or within 
THIRTY DAYS, exclusive of the date of service, if served outside 
the State of* Arizona. 
This is a le^al document. If you do not understand its conse-
quences, you should seek the advice of an attorney. 
ESS My Hand ar/1 the Seal of the Superior Court. 
DATED: Tjct ^ C / ? &>$ 
URT 
v's NAME, ADDRESS, PHONE 
,\ UlTICES CARL M. TOOTLE, ESQ. 
W OFFICES JACOB LEON SI KEN, ESQ. 
N. Stone Ave., Suite 1220 
csun, AZ 8 5701 
2/622-4993 
^ No. 3 7 540 
-
,{?r,VO 8C0 
EXHIBIT "H" 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTA.fl COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA L. SIMMONS and 
MARVIN G. CLAYSON, 
Pla in t i f f s , 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP dba 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
RANDALL L. TUCKETT (agent) 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants . 
\ 
l iv i l No . C f ^ 915 9Q 
DEPOSITION OF< 
BARBARA L. SIMMONS 
Oj. 
March 13, 1990 
At the Hour of 10:00 a.m. 
At The Law Offices Of: 
J E F F S AND J E F F S 
90 Nor th 100 Eas t 
Provo, Utah 84603 
R e p o r t e d by S t a n l e y C. R o u n d y , CSR & N o t a r y P u b l i c 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Pla in t i f f 
Clayson & Simmons: 
For the Pla in t i f f 
S immons: 
JAMES G. CLARK, ESQ. 
96 Eas t 100 South 
Provo, Utah 84601 
RAY PHILLIPS IVIE, ESQ. 
IVIE & YOUNG 
48 Nor th Univers i ty Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84603 
For the Defendant : M. DAYLE J E F F S , ESQ. 
J E F F S AND J E F F S 
90 North 100 Eas t 
STANLEY C. ROUNDY 
313 East 4075 North 
Provo, Utah 84604 
(801) 224-2942 
Q 
him and p 
acc iden t ha 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
a few week 
policy sent 
A 
Q 
A 
for every th 
eve ry th ing , 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
How long after you had t h a t conversa t ion with 
u rchased the i n s u r a n c e was i t before th i s 
ppened? 
I am not su re . 
More t h a n a year? 
I don ' t t h ink it was a year . 
After you purchased the i n s u r a n c e and after 
s passed did you get a copy of the i n su rance 
to you? 
I bel ieve I did. 
Did you read the policy? 
Not rea l ly , because I j u s t took Randy ' s word 
ing I got. I told him I wanted full coverage, 
and he said, "I t 's all r igh t . " 
You were l iving in Gran t sv i l l e at the t ime? 
Yes. 
Was Doug, your husband , l iving out t he re too? 
No, I was working out t h e r e . 
Working cons t ruc t ion out there? 
Yes. 
And the t r a i l e r t h a t you had, do you know 
wha t kind t h a t was? 
A 
Miller Trai 
Q 
I bought i t from Mil ler . J u s t a house t r a i l e r . 
ler Sales in Span i sh . 
Do you know what the length o f i t was? 
23 
t h a t appea r s to bear your s igna tu re? 
A Yes, i t does. 
Q Where were you when you s igned t ha t ? 
A I am not sure if I was in Mr. C la rk ' s office or -
Q Mr. Clark has no ta r i zed t h a t . 
MR. IVIE: Ph i l . 
THE WITNESS: Phi l I mean . 
MR. IVIE: I t h ink you cut her off. She 
d idn ' t know whe the r she was in my office or C la rk ' s . 
Q (By Mr. Jeffs) Do you now know? 
A Mr. C la rk ' s office. 
Q Before you signed t h a t Acceptance of Service 
of Process did you confer with counsel about the su i t t h a t 
Mr. Clayson had b rough t aga ins t you? 
A I th ink me and Mr. Clark t a lked t h a t Sam was 
going to sue me. Is t h a t wha t you mean? 
Q Well, did you confer with Mr. Clark or Mr. 
Ivie before you signed t h a t Acceptance of Service of 
Process? 
A I th ink I t a lked to Mr. Ivie before. 
MR. CLARK: I would be sure if she 
t a lked to me. 
MR. J E F F S : You would be sure? 
MR. CLARK: I can ' t imagine somebody 
29 
husband 
A 
Q 
specific a 
A 
Q 
your hus 
en te red 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
judgmen 
A 
Q 
ever t r i e 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
mean, to 
t h 
l ly 
at t a lked to him? 
I t h ink i t was my h u s b a n d . 
So you wouldn ' t have a recol lec t ion of what 
was said? 
No. 
Do you know of a c e r t a i n t y whe the r or not 
band ever notif ied him t h a t a j u d g m e n t had been 
aga ins t you? 
t? 
d t 
ge 
and my hus 
Q 
A 
Yes, I know he did. 
How do you know t h a t ? 
He told me he did. 
Have ever made any p a y m e n t s on t h a t 
No. 
Have they t r i ed to collect i t? Have Claysons 
,o collect the j udgmen t? 
You mean on the t r a i l e r ? 
Yes. 
Yes. 
How? 
I went -- well , af ter Randy told us t h a t , I 
t a lawyer and t h a t I went and t a lked to -- me 
band ta lked to Mr. Ivie . 
Tha t was af ter the j u d g m e n t was en te red? 
Yes. 
33 
Q 
your wag 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
j udgmen t 
payments 
you mean 
va luab le 
Q 
A 
Q 
Clayson 
F a r m e r s 
A 
di rec t ly 
agreemen 
Q 
Mr. Clay 
j u d g m e n t 
Has Mr. Clayson ever i s sued a g a r n i s h m e n t on 
es? 
No. 
Has he ever a t t a c h e d any bank accounts? 
No. 
Have you ever made any p a y m e n t s on the 
? 
MR. IVIE: What do you mean by 
» on the judgmen t? Do you mean pay money or do 
any th ing of va lue , because if she a s s igns over a 
r igh t to sue F a r m e r s t h a t can be a p a y m e n t . 
(By Mr. Jeffs) I am t a l k i n g about money. 
No. 
Have you en te red in to any a g r e e m e n t with Mr. 
with r ega rd to th i s l a w s u i t commenced at 
Insurance? 
No. 
MR. IVIE: Do you mean an ag reemen t 
with Mr. Clayson or would t h a t inc lude an 
t th rough Mr. Clayson 's a t t o rney? 
MR. J E F F S : I will do it both ways. 
Have you signed any w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t with 
son whereby he 's agreed not t ry to collect th i s 
aga ins t you? 
MR. IVIE: Mr. Clayson di rect ly or does 
34 
t h a t include th rough Mr. Clark? 
have any 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
into any 
MR. J E F F S : No, j u s t d i rec t ly . 
MR. IVIE: Di rec t ly wi th him? Do you 
deal? 
No. 
(By Mr. Jeffs) You have? 
No. 
Okay. Through Mr. Clark have you en te red 
agreement with Mr. Clayson in connect ion with 
th i s l awsu i t so they wouldn ' t be t r y i n g to a t t a c h your 
wages or 
A 
Q 
j udgmen t 
A 
Q 
Ivie? 
A 
Q 
Mr. Ivie? 
A 
Q 
you signe 
collect the judgment? 
I'm not sure I u n d e r s t a n d wha t you mean. 
Who was r e p r e s e n t i n g you at the t ime th i s 
was en tered? 
I d idn ' t rea l ly have anybody. 
It was after the j u d g m e n t t h a t you went to Mr. 
Huh? 
Was it after the j u d g m e n t t h a t you went to 
Yes. 
Mr. Ivie has re fer red to an a s s i g n m e n t . Have 
d an a s s ignment of your claim a g a i n s t F a r m e r s 
In su rance to Mr. Clayson? 
A Repeat t h a t . 
35 
Q Have you signed an a s s ignmen t of your claim 
a g a i n s t F a r m e r s I n su rance to Mr. Clayson? 
A No. 
Q Do you know whe ther t he r e has been an 
ag reemen t worked out t h a t Mr. Clayson could p u r s u e your 
claim aga ins t F a r m e r s In su rance worked out by an 
a t t o rney? 
A No. 
MR. IVIE: The record should show 
p e r h a p s the wi tness is u n c e r t a i n as to the legal mean ing 
of what an a s s ignmen t i s . 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. IVIE: And other t h i n g s l ike t h a t . 
I be l ieve , however, t h a t an ag reemen t of t h a t sor t has 
been reached and I am sure Mr. Clark could produce the 
w r i t t e n form and it would speak for i tself . But as far as 
your knowledge j u s t te l l us what you r emember , and if you 
were wrong, i t ' s j u s t l ike the size of the Ford t ruck engine 
-- we are not ask ing you to be perfect . 
Q (By Mr. Jeffs) In the h a n d l i n g of t h a t 
a s s i g n m e n t was t h a t handled by Mr. Clark or Mr. Ivie? 
MR. IVIE: She obviously doesn ' t recal l 
the c i r cums tance . I th ink i t ' s unfa i r to ask her any more 
ques t ions about i t , un less I have refreshed your memory. 
Do you know yet wha t I am t a lk ing 
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about? 
would te 
Q 
THE WITNESS: No. 
MR. IVIE: Then I would object 
ill her not to specu la te . 
(By Mr. Jeffs) Do 
a r r a n g e m e n t s t h a t are worked out 
Clayson 
aga in s t 
A 
Q 
t h a t he 
F a r m e r s 
A 
Q 
are with regard to t h a t ji 
F a r m e r s Insu rance? 
J u s t to get Sam a t r a i l 
After you went to Mr. 
ca r r ied on correspondence 
you know what 
be tween you and 
udgment and the 
e r . 
and 
t h e 
Mr. 
su i t 
Ivie were you aware 
between h imsel f and 
In su rance r e l a t ive to coverage on the t r a i l e r ? 
Yes. 
(Exhib i t s 7 and 8 
iden t i f i ca t ion . ) 
I show wha t has 
iden t i f i ca t ion as deposi t ion Exhib 
deposi t ion and ask you if you have 
aware of it? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
In t h a t regard was Mr. 
a t t h a t t ime in regard to t h a t m a t t 
A 
I couldn 
Q 
We had j u s t gone and t 
't pay him to r e p r e s e n t me 
Was he ac t ing in your 
were marked 
been marked 
it Number 7 in 
for 
for 
your 
ever seen t h a t or were 
Ivie r e p r e s e n t i n g 
e r ? 
you 
alked to him. I mean 
and t h a t . 
behalf in wr i t in g to 
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EXHIBIT "I" 
rut. E D 
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JAMES G. CLARK, USB #3637 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
k2 No. University Ave., #1 
Provo, Utah Zip-81*601 
Telephone: (801) 37 5-6092 
IN THE SPANISH FORK CIRCUIT COURT, IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARVIN SAM CLAYSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
BARBARA SIMMONS, 
Defendants . 
) ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE 
I OF PROCESS 
I Case No. %& ^ O % 2 ^ 
\ Judge : 
ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
BARBARA SIMMONS, the above-named defendant in this case, 
hereby accepts service of the Summons and Complaint in the 
above-entitled matter as though it were served by due process of 
law. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of //fa , 1986, 
QasJk~0^*^ 
1986. 
BARBARA SIMMONS, Defendant 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this J7 - day of A-pi^H 
My Commission E* 
r/^/rS 
NO TP^Tl PUBLIC, Residing at Utah 
Cy County, State of Utah 
;i0 
EXHIBIT "J" 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT O F ^ T A H COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA L. SIMMONS and 
MARVIN G. CLAYSON, 
Pla in t i f f s , 
v s . 
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP dba 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
RANDALL L. TUCKETT (agent) 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants . 
o -
> ^ 
<-> 
Civ i l N o \ C V < § 8 ^ | l 5 ^ 
DEPOSITIO% OF 
MARVIN G. CLAYSON 
March 13, 1990 
At the Hour of 9:00 a.m. 
At The Law Offices Of: 
J E F F S AND J E F F S 
90 North 100 Eas t 
Provo, Utah 84603 
R e p o r t e d by S t a n l e y C. R o u n d y , CSR & N o t a r y P u b l i c 
APPEARANCES; 
For the Pla in t i f f 
Clayson & Simmons: 
For the Pla in t i f f 
S immons: 
For the Defendant : 
JAMES G. CLARK, ESQ. 
96 Eas t 100 South 
Provo, Utah 84601 
RAY PHILLIPS IVIE, ESQ. 
IVIE & YOUNG 
48 North Univers i ty Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84603 
M. DAYLE J E F F S , ESQ. 
J E F F S AND JEFFS 
90 North 100 Eas t 
Provo, UT 84603 
STANLEY C ROUNDY 
313 East 4075 North 
Provo, Utah 84604 
(801) 224-2942 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Are they res id ing at home? 
No. 
They ' re all ra i sed? 
Yes. 
Do you have any o ther occupat ions or 
avocat ions bes ides your employment? 
A We have had a few sheep and we have had a 
l i t t l e bunch of cows. We ren t some ground and t ry to 
make a li t t l e ex t ra money while we are not working in the 
win te r t ime . 
Q 
A 
calves . 
Q 
Feeder ca t t l e or something? 
Well, j u s t more or less range cows. Cows and 
The c i r cums tances t h a t gave r ise to the facts 
t h a t p r ec ip i t a t ed th i s l awsu i t t h a t is b rough t aga ins t 
F a r m e r s 
I bel ieve 
A 
Q 
A 
foot wide 
Q 
A 
t r a i l e r . 
Q 
I n s u r a n c e arose in connect ion with a t r a i l e r t h a t , 
, was your t r a i l e r , is t h a t correct? 
Tha t is correct . 
Would you describe t h a t t r a i l e r for me? 
It was a 1978 gooseneck twenty foot long, six 
1 
A l ivestock t r a i l e r ? 
Livestock. Actual ly it was a five horse horse 
And t h a t was a gooseneck and t h a t long, did 
7 
you m a k e e n t r y from t h e r e a r or from t h e s i de? 
A F rom t h e r e a r . 
Q A t a i l g a t e t h a t c losed down? 
A The door o p e n e d . 
Q Doors o p e n e d and t h e n you h a d a r a m p or 
w h a t ? 
A No, j u s t s t e p u p . 
Q Was t h a t e q u i p p e d w i t h t a i l l i g h t s ? 
A You b e t . 
Q And r e f l e c t o r s ? 
A You b e t . 
Q How m a n y a x l e s did t h e t r a i l e r h a v e ? 
A I t h a d two a x l e s . 
Q When you say i t ' s a g o o s e n e c k , i t o p e r a t e d l i k e 
a f i f th w h e e l t r a i l e r ? 
A R i g h t . 
Q On a t u r n t a b l e in t h e b a c k of a p i c k u p t r u c k ? 
A Yes . 
Q When did you o r i g i n a l l y p u r c h a s e t h a t t r a i l e r ? 
A 1978 . 
Q From whom was i t p u r c h a s e d ? 
A I would h a v e to t h i n k . W h a t i s t h e n a m e of 
t h i s p l a c e ? They w a s in P a y s o n . T h e y moved to P r o v o -
O r e m . I t ' s a big t r a i l e r o u t f i t ou t h e r e in O r e m . 
Q When you p u r c h a s e d i t w a s i t a new t r a i l e r ? 
8 
A 
Q 
r e a s o n for 
A 
t r a i n e d a 
c o l t s . 
Q 
home i s? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
t h e t r a i l e r 
A 
Q 
p o s s e s s i o n 
t h i s l i n e o 
a c t i o n . I 
Yes , i t w a s b r a n d n e w . 
And w h e n you p u r c h a s e d i t w h a t was y o u r 
h a v i n g t h a t s i ze of a t r a i l e r ? 
I h a d a few h o r s e s a t t h e r a c e t r a c k . We 
few r a c e h o r s e s , t oo . I h a d some m a r e s a n d 
Do you h a v e some a c r e a g e ou t w h e r e you r 
J u s t an a c r e . 
You l e a s e o t h e r g r o u n d ? 
Yes . 
You k e p t y o u r h o r s e s a n d l i v e s t o c k on i t? 
Yes . 
Do you r e m e m b e r w h a t t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e of 
was? 
R i g h t o f fhand I d o n ' t r e m e m b e r . 
Do you h a v e a n y d o c u m e n t s s t i l l in y o u r 
s h o w i n g t h e p u r c h a s e of t h a t t r a i l e r ? 
MR. CLARK: Wel l , D a y l e , I objec t to 
f q u e s t i o n i n g . I t h i n k i t ' s i r r e l e v a n t to t h i s 
wou ld l i k e to i n t e r p o s e t h a t o b j e c t i o n a t t h i s 
t i m e . I m e a n t h e v a l u e of t h e t r a i l e r h a s a l r e a d y b e e n 
e s t a b l i s h e 
C l a y s o n vs 
d for Res j u d i c a t a a t $7 ,000 in t h e a c t i o n of Sam 
. B a r b a r a L. S i m m o n s . 
MR. J E F F S : T h a t may or m a y not be t h e 
9 
been en te red in your favor aga in s t B a r b a r a Simmons by 
Mr. Clark? 
A Yes, he informed me. 
Q What collection efforts have been made to t ry 
and collect t h a t j u d g m e n t for you? 
MR. CLARK: If you know. 
A I don ' t know. 
Q Have you ever had conversa t ions with Mr. 
Ivie , Mr. Phi l Ivie , r e l a t ive to the efforts t h a t were going 
to made a g a i n s t F a r m e r s In su rance to t ry and get t h a t 
j u d g m e n t col lected? 
A Right at the very s t a r t before he recommended 
MR. CLARK: I object to the ques t ion . 
It seeks a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t pr ivi lege in format ion . I also 
would have to admonish Sam. Again l i s t en to the ques t ion 
careful ly if you are going to answer i t , because the 
ques t ion you are answer ing is not the ques t ion he asked. 
Q (By Mr. Jeffs) Was Mr. Ivie r e p r e s e n t i n g you? 
MR. IVIE: I th ink p e r h a p s it would be 
b e t t e r if you would ask if Mr. Ivie gave him any legal 
advice or if he sought legal advice. 
MR. J E F F S : I a ssumed t h a t counsel 
would object to t h a t . 
MR. IVIE: No, i t ' s a p re l imina ry 
26 
Q Was t h a t at the t ime t h a t he re fe r red you to 
Mr. Clark? 
A Yes. 
MR. IVIE: Actua l ly , Dayle , if i t would 
help clarify, I know I am not the w i t n e s s , bu t I wrote a 
number of l e t t e r s to F a r m e r s in an effort to get them to 
pay for i t . When it became obvious t h a t F a r m e r s re jec ted , 
then in my opinion I couldn ' t con t inue to advise Mr. 
Clayson. I had been on record as r e p r e s e n t i n g Mrs. 
S immons. So at t h a t t ime I informed Mr. Clayson t h a t he 
would have to obta in s e p a r a t e legal counsel because I 
couldn ' t r e p r e s e n t both t he i r i n t e r e s t s , and he inqu i red as 
to a t t o r n e y s , and I bel ieve I gave him severa l names , but 
one of them was Mr. C la rk . 
Q (By Mr. Jeffs) After the j u d g m e n t was en te red 
in your favor did you en t e r in to any ag reemen t with 
Ba rba ra Simmons t h a t you would awa i t the l i t i ga t ion we 
are now in to get your paymen t for the t r a i l e r ? 
A I don' t know. 
Q Do you know if you ever made an a s s ignment 
of the j u d g m e n t to her? 
A I haven ' t . 
Q Did she ever make an a s s i g n m e n t to you of the 
claims t h a t she had a g a i n s t F a r m e r s ? 
A No. 
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EXHIBIT "K" 
CERTIFIED COPY 
C <4 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR^XJTAH^COO^t^.A 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
BARBARA L. SIMMONS and 
MARVIN SAM CLAYSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP dba 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
RANDALL L. TUCKETT (agent) 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. CV-88-915 % 
Judge Cullen Y. Christ^nsen 
Deposition of: 
JAMES G. CLARK 
• * * 
Deposition of JAMES G. CLARK, taken at the instance 
and request of the Defendants, at the law offices of JEFFS & 
JEFFS, 90 North 100 East, Provo, Utah, on the 11th day of 
September, 1990, at the hour of 9:45 a.m., before LANETTE 
SHINDURLING, a Certified Shorthand Reporter, Utah License No. 
122, and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah. 
m^ 
Associated Professional Reporters 
10 West Broadway / Suite 200 / Sail Lake City, Utah 84101 
Q When did that take place? 
A I don't remember the date, Mr. Jeffs. She came to 
me, provided me with a copy of the letter she had received 
from Farmers that they would not provide her with a defense in 
the case. At that time I, to the best of my recollection, I 
informed her that she would need to get independent counsel if 
Farmers wasn't going to represent her in the case, and I told 
her that I thought that her counsel's primary concern should 
be with regard to Farmers denying the defense. Of course, I 
was willing to work with him in any way, but she would need to 
get counsel because she was a defendant in a lawsuit. 
Q Did you ever have any contact with any counsel 
relative to him representing her in regard to that after that 
time? 
A Not that I recall, no. 
Q After you took the judgment or entered the judgment 
in behalf of Mr. Clayson against Barbara Simmons, did you have 
any conversation or discussion with Barbara Simmons relative 
to the judgment that had been entered against her? 
A Yes. 
Q And when and where did that take place? 
A Again, that would have taken place in my office. 
She was — she again came in and accompanied Sam Clayson, 
wanted to know what could be done with regard to — Sam, of 
course, wanted to know what could be done with regard to 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
10 
Q Prior to before representing Barbara Simmons in 
connection with this lawsuit against Farmers Insurance, were 
all of your meetings with Barbara Simmons with Sam Clayson 
present? 
A Well, let me first say, Mr. Jeffs, that the preface 
statement in that question I'm not sure is accurate. You say 
besides representing Barbara Simmons in this action and I 
don't know — 
Q Let me rephrase the question. 
A I don't know necessarily if that's relevant to the 
question. I don't necessarily think my involvement in the 
case is as a representative of Barbara Simmons. I represent 
Mr. Clayson primarily pursuant to the assignment we have 
received from Mrs. Simmons of her claims against Farmers. 
Q But you are counsel of record in this case? 
A Yes. 
Q For Barbara Simmons. And before you undertook to 
represent her in this case against Farmers Insurance, were all 
of your meetings with Barbara Simmons meetings at which both 
she and Sam Clayson were present? 
A To the best of my recollection, yes. 
Q And at one of those meetings the agreement for 
assignment of a claim against Farmers Insurance was signed by 
her? 
A Yes. 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
EXHIBIT "L" 
CNC REPORT 
NAME I ftr»«*fc Hf l lman^miaP 
" * « ! ProYP Ego #61 
INSURED! Barbara Simmons 
POLICY NOx 76-11^8 0779 
TRUCK CLAIM NO* 
LOSS DATE: 5-11-85 
no 
Does an RO file exists YES NO XX 
Coverage Question: Is this horse trailer 
arm wagon or farm implement?? 
oncsidered a utility trailer or 
FACTS OF 
get 
COVERAGE: 
hay 
to 
accident 
This hors 
A borrowed a horse t r a i l e r from a frierid to go 
zona to t some or for some other reason. At the XM£ time of the 
KaltttiaaXXaastSCXa e^^  the borrowed horse t r a i l e r was loaded with hay. 
H e r is l icensed in Utah with l i cense #B99921 and>is r eg i s t e r ed to a Marvin 
7Son of Spanish Fork, The t r a i l e r is a I+-horse modfel, with a gocse neck so i t 
Id be ca l led a 5th wheel t r a i l e r . The t r a i l e r is a HNC, model GSNt 1978 year 
insur d '-a s an E-U endorsement en his policy for a 
txJ+Xir 
t-ailer. y 6»Uf^jL(U6 
Pacts of Accident! The insured and fla':ghter were t r a v e l i n g a t n igh t when 
ir pick ujl/'truck -pull ing the horse t r a i l e r broke dowrj^  They were stopped on 
t r ave l l edepor t ion of the roadway without l i g h t s 
) a long , "h i t the t r a i l e r &ni then C going opposite 
E. T ra i l e r t o t a l l e d and no lama^e to twoingvehicleJ 
•he oth r pa r t i e s for the i r i n j u r i e s . Being handle 
forfU5 minutes and XMJCfiffll B 
d i rec t ion h i t the "ear of 
A lawsuit has been f i l e d 
by Arizona BCO 09. 
'fotjL&^f%&/ 
Estimated Costs: 7ailer $2,000. 
Agent Involvementt NONE, but the agent wrote a $£00 deductible on the 1965 
3rd PU *hen A says it is <#rorth $350. 
RecommendationiNo coverage as a utility trailer. No extension of coverage 
E-U. This horse trailer is KJCaH built and sold for a specilize-* purpose-the 
ig of horses ani their eauipment of feed. It is not a farm wagon or farm 
ient# Arizona BCO 09 says that their R.QAPD manager states the horse trailer 
• a utility trailer or farm wagon or farm implement. 
Enclosuresi 
loss report 
copy of registeration 
tfbfrjuiL* J,A\r\ 
